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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) has received 
considerable criticism from the United States for the human rights 
issues raised by its Internet surveillance program.  For example, 
according to a 2012 Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) Report 
for Congress, Freedom House ranked the People’s Republic of 
China as “one of the five countries with the lowest levels of Internet 
and ‘new media’ freedom.”1  Some Western commentators echo this 
same type of criticism of the PRC’s Internet surveillance program.2  
At first glance, such criticism seems overwhelmingly justified, if not 
for any other reason that approximately seventy PRC citizens have 
been incarcerated for writing about politically sensitive topics online 
in the past few years,3 which has raised serious concerns over the 
freedom of speech there.  It is difficult to assess the validity of this 
criticism of the PRC’s Internet surveillance laws and policies 
without clearly designating a referent.  Using U.S. Internet 
surveillance laws and policies as the referent, PRC Internet 
surveillance laws and policies arguably can be seen as more in line 
with international human rights norms, especially with regard to 
predictability, although that might be changing on account of the 
recent Snowden revelations.  While the Snowden revelations 
undoubtedly have had catastrophic effects on national security, they 
potentially have helped improve the human rights situation in the 
                                               
1 See THOMAS LUM ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42601, CHINA, INTERNET 
FREEDOM, AND U.S. POLICY 1 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ 
R42601.pdf (providing a policy overview of Internet freedom in China).  
2 See, e.g., Richard Klein, An Analysis of China’s Human Rights Policies in Tibet: 
China’s Compliance with the Mandates of International Law Regarding Civil and Political 
Rights, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 115, 149–64 (2011) (describing how “the Chinese 
government’s continuing regulation of the Internet . . . violates international stand-
ards of free expression”).  
3 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: CHINA 10 (May 2012) 
(“NGOs estimated that since late February approximately 50 human rights activists 
and lawyers were formally arrested or placed under extralegal detention, up to 200 
people were placed under house arrest, and 15 were charged with ‘inciting subver-
sion of state power.’”); FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2011: A GLOBAL 
ASSESSMENT AND INTERNET AND DIGITAL MEDIA 105 (2011), available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2011 (featur-
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United States by disabusing U.S. citizens of the notion that the U.S. 
Constitution actually protects them from unreasonable Internet 
searches and seizures by the government. 
 In presenting and defending this argument, this article is 
divided into five parts, including this brief introduction and an 
equally brief conclusion in Parts 1 and 5, respectively.  Part 2 sets 
out the obligations under international law concerning Internet 
surveillance, which is helpful in assessing the U.S. and PRC 
approaches to Internet surveillance.  Part 3 explores the U.S. laws 
governing Internet surveillance — especially the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) and the USA Patriot Act.  Part 
4 analyzes the PRC laws governing Internet surveillance.  While 
there are numerous articles that analyze the PRC approach to 
Internet surveillance, it would appear that none of them provide the 
actual language of the PRC laws that directly relate to Internet 
surveillance,4 let alone analyze the actual PRC laws, as this article 
does.  Moreover, this article appears to be the first to mention the 
predictability issues associated with Internet surveillance laws.  
These two features of this article in and of themselves make this a 
valuable contribution to the literature, with the other features — 
including the comparative elements of this analysis5 — only adding 
                                               
4 See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Privacy Laws and Privacy Levers: Online Surveillance Ver-
sus Economic Development in the People’s Republic of China, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 853, 853–
862 (2013) (quoting only the PRC Constitution and the General Civil Code, and oth-
erwise referring to secondary sources for language and support); Omar Saleem, 
China’s Internet Policies within the Global Community, 17 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 299 (2012) 
(quoting the PRC Constitution without reference to the language of PRC laws); Jyh-
An Lee & Ching-Yi Liu, Forbidden City Enclosed by the Great Firewall: The Law and 
Power of Internet Filtering in China, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 125 (2012) (arguing that 
the Internet in China is regulated by code rather than law); Jyh-An Lee, Regulating 
Blogging and Microblogging in China, 91 OR. L. REV. 301, 311 (2012) (detailing how 
more than “sixty government regulations, enforced at both the national and local 
levels, regulate online content). Please note that only the Chinese version of PRC 
laws (except the Hong Kong Basic Law and the Macao Basic Law) are authentic and 
have legal effect.  See, e.g., John Bahrij & Lily Ko, An Overview of English Resources 
for Chinese Legal Research, 13 LEGAL INFO. MGMT 25 (2013) ; Wei Luo, How to Find the 
Law of the People's Republic of China: A Research Guide and Selective Annotated Bibliog-
raphy, 88 LAW LIBR. J. 402, 408 (1996) (stating that the primary source of law in the 
People’s Republic of China is statutes). The English translations provided in this 
article have come from Westlaw China, which arguably provides the most accurate 
translations of the PRC documents being reviewed in this article.  
5 It is important to note that a thorough and direct comparison of the two laws 
is difficult inasmuch as the context and purposes of the U.S. and PRC Internet sur-
veillance laws are so dramatically different. For example, U.S. laws on Internet sur-
veillance clearly are guided and limited by the U.S. Constitution and important ju-
dicial cases, and so the basic goals and substantial purposes of those laws are to 
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to this article’s overwhelming value.  Again, this article’s thesis is 
that the PRC’s Internet surveillance laws, while not ideal, are better 
than the U.S. laws with regard to predictability inasmuch as there is 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the PRC.  Admittedly, the 
United States might be catching up in the sense that U.S. citizens 
might not have a reasonable expectation of privacy anymore after 
the Snowden revelations, notwithstanding the Fourth Amendment.  
To be clear, this certainly is not something to be proud of in either 
jurisdiction. 
The main tension for both the United States and the PRC lies in 
the individuals’ right to privacy and the public benefit of the 
government being able to detect and respond to threats to national 
security.  Such tension between privacy and national security when 
it comes to Internet surveillance has been well documented in other 
studies, and the purpose of this article is not to rehash that debate.6  
Nor is this article’s purpose to document the efforts of the People’s 
Republic of China to interfere with Internet usage through 
surveillance, which has been provided in other studies.7  Rather, this 
article analyzes and evaluates U.S. and PRC laws in relation to 
Internet surveillance with the aim of assessing whether a reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists in either jurisdiction and whether the 
laws impact predictability.  Both jurisdictions are similar in that they 
both may have elements that are not entirely in compliance with 
international obligations, mainly with regard to proportionality and 
necessity of the measures, among other issues.  Moreover, both use 
“delegated control” over Internet service providers (“ISPs”) to 
control the Internet.  The main difference is that U.S. law gives the 
appearance that government Internet surveillance is restricted by 
law, whereas PRC law does not create such an appearance.  On the 
                                               
protect civil rights and limit the power of executive agencies. The independent ju-
dicial branch of the United States also clarifies and refines the substantive meaning 
of those rules. However, in the People’s Republic of China, the legislative and judi-
cial branches are controlled by the executive branch and the Communist Party of 
China. All the PRC laws, regulations and guidelines are merely tools to maintain 
economic development, social stability and the Party's ruling position. Some of 
those PRC rules about Internet surveillance are formulated in a general and ambig-
uous way in order to pretend to protect civil rights, while the top Party leaders and 
vested interest groups remain opposed to the actual implementation of those rules. 
To make matters worse, the dependent judicial branch cannot effectively prevent or 
mitigate this situation.  
6 See, e.g., A. Wayne MacKay, Human Rights in the Global Village: The Challenges 
of Privacy and National Security, 20 NAT'L J. CONST. L. 1, 6 (2006) (describing National 
Security and privacy measures in the context of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism).  
7 See generally Lee & Liu, supra note 4, at 125; Lee, supra note 4, at 609. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/1
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contrary, it is common knowledge and is even reflected in the law 
that the PRC government has the power and discretion to conduct 
Internet surveillance at will.8  In a way, the PRC approach seems 
more transparent and even honest, which certainly is not to condone 
the PRC’s policies or the punishment that might flow from the 
implementation of these policies.  Admittedly, U.S. citizens and 
people throughout the world have become more cognizant of the 
lack of privacy on the Internet in the wake of the Snowden NSA 
surveillance leaks, which might not have otherwise happened under 
the (mistaken) belief the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution actually protects privacy from such surveillance.9  In 
the end, this article asserts that the PRC Internet surveillance 
policies, at least prior to sentencing,10 are more compliant with 
human rights norms than U.S. policies, at least with regard the 
element of predictability.  As the old proverb goes:  Better the Devil 
you know than the Devil you don’t. 
 
2.  INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNET SURVEILLANCE 
 
 The Edward Snowden saga has thrust U.S. Internet 
surveillance and its associated privacy and freedom-of-speech 
issues onto center stage, along with many other issues.11  On June 5, 
                                               
8 See generally Bartow, supra note 4, at 853–62. 
9 For instance, when a freedom of expression advocacy group surveyed over 
520 American writers, 28 percent have curtailed their social media activities and 24 
percent of those respondents have avoided discussing certain topics on the tele-
phone.  See THE FDR GROUP, PEN AMERICA, CHILLING EFFECTS: NSA SURVEILLANCE 
DRIVES U.S. WRITERS TO SELF-CENSOR (2013), available at http://www.pen.org/ 
chilling-effects (showing that the American public is less informed than writers are 
in regard to the degree of internet surveillance in the United States).  See generally 
Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101 (2008). 
10 With regard to the pre-sentencing delimitation of this article, critics will ar-
gue that the inability to know whether you are on the PRC’s blacklist, at least until 
you are stopped at the border or somewhere else, should be factored into the pre-
dictability calculation when comparing the policies of the United States and the 
People’s Republic of China. However, the same can be said about decisions of the 
U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and intelligence agencies to engage in 
surveillance, with the target only learning of such surveillance at the point of arrest, 
and so it arguably is a wash. 
11 For example, revelations came to light in 2002 that the National Security 
Agency (“NSA”) had been spying on German Chancellor Angela Merkel and 34 
other world leaders.  See James Ball, NSA Monitored Calls of 35 World Leaders after US 
Official Handed over Contacts, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 24, 2013, http://www.          
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2013, the Guardian began to publish a series of articles that disclosed 
highly classified aspects of the electronic surveillance operations of 
the National Security Agency (“NSA”) and provided classified 
documents to support such allegations.12  These NSA operations 
include access to “vast databases containing e-mails, online chats, 
and the browsing histories of millions of individuals”13 and Internet 
traffic of U.S. citizens.14  The NSA Internet surveillance program also 
involves the targeting of foreign persons “reasonably believed to be 
outside the United States” using broad-based Internet surveillance 
to obtain information from the servers of Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, 
                                               
theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls (re-
porting on Snowden’s document claiming surveillance of the phone conversations 
of world leaders by the National Security Agency). According to Snowden, the NSA 
monitored Chancellor Merkel’s mobile phone for 11 years, including the numbers 
called, duration and location (metadata) and the contents of her calls and text mes-
sages.  See Derek Scally, Dial M for Merkel: Angela’s Next Move, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 2, 
2013, at 1 (reporting that Merkel’s phone was monitored for 11 years by the National 
Security Agency and what the implications for Germany were). U.S. and U.K. rela-
tions also have been strained due in part to Snowden’s revelations about a joint 
U.S.-British spying operation on the Internet.  See Paul Richter & Ken Dilanian, US 
Spying Scandal Straining Ties with Europe, DAILY WORLD, Nov. 1, 2013, available at 
http://www.articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/30/world/la-fg-nsa-diplo-fallout-
20131031 (reporting on strained U.S.-U.K. relations in the aftermath of the Snowden 
reports). Snowden also provided leaks indicating that U.S. intelligence officials had 
hacked into the e-mail accounts of Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto and Fe-
lipe Calderon.  See Mexican Diplomats Say Obama Promises Investigation into NSA Spy-
ing, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 22, 2013, at 1, http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2013/oct/22/mexico-president-nsa-spying-email (reporting on Snowden indicat-
ing that the email accounts of Mexican Presidents had been hacked). Snowden also 
disclosed that U.S. intelligence spied on Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and 
other South American leaders.  See Jonathan Watts, Brazilian President Postpones 
Washington Visit Over NSA Spying, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 17, 2013, http://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/17/brazil-president-snub-us-nsa (reporting 
that Brazilian and other South American leaders were implicated by the National 
Security Agency’s surveillance).  
12 See Jeffrey T. Richelson, Take It To The Limit: Smith v. Maryland and NSA’s 
Phone Metadata Collection Program, NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVES (Sept. 4, 2013), 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB436/ (providing official detail of 
the phone monitoring by the National Security Agency).  
13 See Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Everything a User 
does on the Internet,’ THE GUARDIAN, July 31, 2013, http://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data (describing 
XKeyscore, which allows National Security Agency analysts to go through the in-
ternet history of millions of individuals).  
14 See Richelson, supra note 12, at 3 (describing “electronic surveillance opera-
tions involving not only extensive collection of foreign communications, including 
Internet traffic, but the collection of the metadata associated with phone calls [for-
eign and domestic] made by United States citizens.”)  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/1
  
2015] INTERNET SURVEILLANCE IN THE U.S. AND CHINA 425 
Facebook and other companies.15  This program gives the 
government access to search histories, e-mail content, file transfers, 
and live chat.16  The source of this information was revealed to be 
Edward J. Snowden — former CIA agent and NSA-contractor with 
Booz Allen Hamilton.17  On June 14, the U.S. government filed a 
sealed criminal complaint against Snowden.18  Snowden was in 
Hong Kong at the time and reportedly spent his final two days in 
Hong Kong at the Russian Consulate.19  He received a SAFEPASS 
issued by the Ecuadorian embassy in London and traveled to 
Moscow while seeking asylum elsewhere.20  At the time, the U.S. 
government sought to discourage states from offering asylum to 
Snowden and went so far as to seek extradition.21  The story has 
continued to unfold over time, as more leaked information has been 
revealed and the United States continues to try to gain custody of 
Snowden.  These incidents have raised questions over the adequacy 
of contemporary IT law, which seems more focused on the 
obligations of data users to protect personal data than the 
obligations of states not to surreptitiously gather and use such data, 
whether for national security reasons or for other reasons.  While 
drafters of IT law scramble to create new regulations that directly 
and adequately address these new types of situations, international 
law provides a number of stopgaps that are designed to limit state 
behavior in this area, one of which is the right to privacy under 
international human rights law.  This part explores the contours of 
this stopgap.  
                                               
15 See Timothy B. Lee, Here’s Everything We Know About PRISM to Date, THE 
WASH. POST WONKBLOG, June 12, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
wonkblog/wp/2013/06/12/heres-everything-we-know-about-prism-to-date/ 
(describing the PRISM system which the National Security Agency uses “to gain 
access to the private communications of users of nine popular internet services” 
and the reaction of Internet companies).  
16 See Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps into User 
Data of Apple, Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, http://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data (reporting on the 
previously undisclosed PRISM system and including the reaction of representatives 
from Google and Apple).  
17 See Richelson, supra note 12, at 3 (discussing how The Guardian revealed 
Snowden was the source of the leaked NSA information). 
18 Id. 
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 3-4. 
21 Id. at 4. 
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The Internet always has posed interesting issues for 
international law.22  In particular, numerous commentators see the 
Internet as having undermined traditional notions of state 
sovereignty by diminishing the role of territorial boundaries.23  Of 
course, the Internet has not been entirely bad for international law, 
instead improving the efficiency of treaty negotiations, adjudication, 
and enforcement.24  However, the crosscutting issues that the 
Internet has raised have proven to be quite troublesome, especially 
with the limitless data storage and efficient search capabilities that 
exist or appear to exist.25  This part emphasizes the important role 
that the Internet has played with government regulation, state 
power, and civil society.26  In particular, Internet surveillance of 
domestic citizens and foreigners, whether through selective 
targeting or done on a mass scale, can have a significant chilling 
                                               
22 See generally Molly Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 394 (2013). 
23 See Henry H. Perritt, Cyberspace and State Sovereignty, 3 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 
155, 156–71 (1997) (investigating how information technology is shaping the new 
world order); ULRICH BECK, POWER IN THE GLOBAL AGE: A NEW GLOBAL POLITICAL 
ECONOMY xi (Kathleen Cross trans., Polity Press 2005) (2002) (exploring how na-
tional and international boundaries are dissolving in light of modernity); Anne-
Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White, The Future of International Law is Domes-
tic (or, The European Way of Law), 47 HARV. J INT'L L. 327, 327–52 (2006) (“The tradi-
tional Westphalia sovereignty state system with ‘defined physical territories’ of 
states, exclusive and isolated, can no longer be appropriate in the era of globaliza-
tion.”).  See also Henry H. Perritt, Cyberspace Self-Government: Town Hall Democracy 
or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413, 437–38 (1997) (exploring the 
idea of self-governance of cyberspace); Am. Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 
160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that typically “jurisdictional limits are related to 
geography; geography, however, is a virtually meaningless construct on the Inter-
net”).  See generally Peter Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: International Choice 
of Law and the Internet, 32 INT’L LAW. 991 (1998); Laura Ann Forbes, More Convenient 
Crime: Why States Must Regulate Internet-Related Criminal Activity under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 20 PACE L. REV. 189 (1999).  But see JACK L. GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, 
WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006) (discussing 
governmental control of the Internet). 
24 See Henry H. Perritt, The Internet is Changing International Law, 73 Chi-Kent 
L. Rev. 997, 1000 (1997) (explaining how Non-Governmental Organizations 
(“NGOs”) are shaping international law with the help of media attention through 
the internet). 
25 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE,  THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 32–33 (Jack M. Balkin and Beth Simone Noveck eds., New York 
University Press 2004) (coining internet surveillance as “dataveillance,” as surveil-
lance is performed by collecting facts and data). 
26 See INTERNET AND SURVEILLANCE: THE CHALLENGES OF WEB 2.0 AND SOCIAL 
MEDIA 10 (Christian Fuchs et al. eds., 2013) (2011) (discussing the political implica-
tions of internet surveillance, citing the USA Patriot Act as an example of a reaction 
to internet surveillance capabilities).   
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/1
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effect on expression and undermine the privacy rights that the 
international human rights regime was designed to protect.27  
Traditional state-centered responses seem inadequate in facing 
these types of challenges,28 and so it would appear that greater 
innovation with regard to international governance and 
surveillance institutions is needed.  Regardless, this part describes 
international law as it currently exists in relation to these two areas. 
 
2.1. The Legal Significance of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and U.N. Special Rapporteur Reports 
 
Before analyzing the actual ICCPR provisions and secondary 
sources of law with regard to the rights to privacy and freedom of 
expression, it is important to explain the legal significance of the 
writings of U.N. Special Rapporteurs, inasmuch as the analysis in 
the next section relies on such writings, and states might claim that 
those reports do not bind them when it comes to interference in 
privacy rights.  This section also addresses the argument that the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not apply 
to the People’s Republic of China because it is not a state party to 
the covenant.  
                                               
27 The right to privacy in this digital age, especially the Internet, is crucial to 
the “promotion and protection of human rights.” U.N. General Assembly, The 
Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 
on 18 December 2013 [on the report of the Third Committee (A/68/456/Add.2)], 
A/RES/68/167; Progress Report on the European Electronic Communications 
Market 2009 (15th report), Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, COM (2010) 253 final/3, Aug. 25, 2010, at 15.  See also 
Jonathon W. Penney, Internet Access Rights: A Brief History and Intellectual Origins, 
38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 10 (2011) (explaining how the internet holds potential for 
great political progress, but also for censorship and surveillance); U.N. Human 
Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Key Trends and Challenges to 
the Right of All Individuals to Seek, Receive and Impart Information and Ideas of 
All Kinds Through the Internet, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27, May 16, 2011, at 14, ¶¶ 
49–50 (reporting on the applicability of human rights norms and standards to the 
usage of the internet for communication and expression); JAMES MICHAEL & 
GEORGES B. KUTUKDJIAN, PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE STUDY, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY ch. 3 (1994) (providing information on “countries with national data 
protection laws and access to government information”). 
28 See MILTON MUELLER, NETWORKS AND STATES: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF 
INTERNET GOVERNANCE 1 (2010) (discussing pressure between governments, state 
sovereignty, and the non-territorial space of the internet). 
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Starting with the legal significance of the writings of U.N. 
Special Rapporteurs, two cases of the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”) are relevant by analogy.  In the 1969 North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases, the ICJ asked whether a lex ferenda rule formulated by the 
International Law Commission could become binding international 
law by virtue of codification.29  The issue was whether Germany was 
bound by the equidistance rule under Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, considering that Germany had 
not signed this Convention.30  Denmark and the Netherlands 
acknowledged that Article 6 was not declaratory of an existing 
customary rule because “prior to the Conference, continental shelf 
law was only in the formative stage, and State practice lacked 
uniformity.”31  However, they argued that there already was an 
emerging customary law that was crystallized in Article 6,32 and 
“the process of the definition and consolidation of the emerging 
customary law took place through the work of the International Law 
Commission, the reaction of governments to that work and the 
proceedings of the Geneva Conference.”33  The International Court 
of Justice rejected the argument of Denmark and the Netherlands 
that the equidistance rule under Article 6 was an emerging 
customary law that was defined and consolidated through the work 
of the International Law Commission.34  Upon review of the process 
undertaken by the International Law Commission leading up to the 
adoption of the equidistance rule, the International Court of Justice 
concluded that the rule “was proposed by the Commission with 
considerable hesitation, somewhat on an experimental basis, at most 
de lege ferenda, and not at all de lege lata or as an emerging rule of 
customary international law.”35  Based on the ruling in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, it can be stated that, when it comes to a lex 
                                               
29 See North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.) 1969 
I.C.J. REP. 3, 38 (Feb. 20, 1969) (stating Germany’s argument that a lex ferenda rule 
could be formulated by way of existing customary international law). 
30 See id. at 23 (stating that the equidistance rule under Article 6 was the most 
convenient but that in itself is not reason for the rule to be chosen as a force of law).  
31 Id. at 38. 
32 See id. (arguing that the practice of delimitation was a part of customary 
law).  
33 Id. 
34 See id. (concluding that Germany did not act in a way to incur the obligations 
of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention or customary law).  
35 Id.  See also Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & 
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ferenda principle formulated by the International Law Commission 
(and by extension a U.N. Special Rapporteur), codification by the 
International Law Commission is not sufficient to give rise to a 
binding rule of law.36  By extension, if the International Law 
Commission provides its formulation of law without hesitation and 
not on an experimental basis, then it might have sufficient weight to 
be considered binding, or at least to be closer to the binding side of 
the binding/non-binding dichotomy when one considers these 
norms on a sliding scale of legal weight.37 
In the 2010 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo ICJ judgment concerning the 
case between the Republic of Guinea and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, one of the main questions was whether the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo had violated Diallo’s individual rights under 
international law when it arrested, detained and expelled him in 
1995–1996.38  Diallo was a Guinean businessman residing in Zaire 
who had been seeking repayment of debts that oil-related 
companies there had owed his businesses when the detention and 
expulsion occurred.39  Guinea brought the claim in the form of 
diplomatic protection of its citizen for a “serious violation of 
international law” by the Democratic Republic of the Congo for its 
mistreatment of Diallo.40  Concerning the 1995–1996 arrest, 
detention, and expulsion of Diallo, the International Court of Justice 
referred to Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which provides:  
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the 
present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in 
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and 
shall, except where compelling reasons of national security 
otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against 
his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be 
represented for the purpose before, the competent authority 
                                               
36 See HUGH THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 16–
21 (1972) (discussing how codified laws enter the international legal realm). 
37 See generally Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 
77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413 (1983) (describing the international legal order as being made 
up of norms of varying weight). 
38 See generally Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Re-
public of Congo) 2010 ICJ REP. 639, 659–73 (Nov. 30). 
39 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the 
Congo), Preliminary Objections, 2007 ICJ REP. 582, 586 (May 24). 
40 Id. at 585–86. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
 
430 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:2 
or a person or persons especially designated by the 
competent authority.41   
The International Court of Justice determined that an alien who was 
lawfully in the territory of a state could only be expelled if the 
decision was taken in accordance with law, the law itself was 
compliant with international law, and the expulsion was not 
arbitrary in nature.42  The International Court of Justice confirmed 
that this approach was supported by the jurisprudence of the 
Human Rights Committee, including its General Comments.43  The 
International Court of Justice then explained the legal significance 
of such General Comments:  
Although the Court is in no way obliged, in the exercise of 
its judicial functions, to model its own interpretation of the 
Covenant on that of the Committee, it believes that it should 
ascribe great weight to the interpretation adopted by this 
independent body that was established specifically to 
supervise the application of that treaty.  The point here is to 
achieve the necessary clarity and the essential consistency of 
international law, as well as legal security, to which both the 
individuals with guaranteed rights and the States obliged to 
comply with treaty obligations are entitled.44 
In other words, General Comments of the Human Rights Committee 
have “great weight” when used to interpret the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which means at a minimum 
that they need to be taken into consideration in good faith when 
interpreting the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.  At most, they have some binding weight on state parties to 
the Covenant.  The fact that these types of instruments have 
significant legal weight is supported by a number of reliable 
secondary sources.45  Of course, the Human Rights Committee sees 
                                               
41 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the 
Congo), Judgment, 2010 ICJ REP. 639, 663 (Nov. 30). 
42 Id. 
43 See id. at 663–64 (confirming the Human Rights Committee’s support via the 
Covenant to ensure compliance).  
44 Id. at 664.  
45 See Int’l Law Ass’n Berlin Conference, Sept. 26–27, 2003, Final Report on the 
Impact of Findings of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 27, 43 (2004) (re-
ferring to the General Comments of the Human Rights Committee as “authorita-
tive,” of  “considerable importance” and of “considerable weight”).  See generally 
Helen Keller & Leena Grover, General Comments of the Human Rights Committee and 
their Legitimacy, in UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES: LAW AND LEGITIMACY 116, 
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its General Comments as being an integral part of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, inasmuch as they form part 
of the supervisory machinery created by the Covenant,46 although 
the Human Rights Committee might not be entirely without bias on 
this issue.  This article is not inclined to give the same amount of 
legal weight to these General Comments as the Human Rights 
Committee does, or else this type of interpretation quickly would 
become a shortcut to outright amendment of the Covenant, which 
could not have been intended by the member states when drafting 
the amendment provision of the Covenant in Article 51.  Still, when 
one considers these norms on a sliding scale of legal weight, as 
opposed to a binding/non-binding dichotomy, it is relatively easy 
to see these norms as being much closer to the binding end of the 
spectrum in light of the ICJ’s opinion of their legal significance.  At 
a minimum, the legal weight given to International Law 
Commission pronouncements and interpretations by General 
Comments of the Human Rights Committee are equivalent to the 
reports of UN Special Rapporteurs inasmuch as they all constitute 
secondary sources of international law from relatively authoritative 
entities. 
Hugh Thirlway provides an interesting systematic explanation 
of the significance of these types of determinations by relatively 
authoritative entities in international law.  Thirlway identifies the 
two main methods of codification as codification by states and 
codification by scholars, such as the members of the International 
Law Commission, members of the Human Rights Committee and 
U.N. Special Rapporteurs, “acting as scholars and not as 
representatives of any State or group of States.”47  The second 
method is called codification juridique, and it involves the 
                                               
116–98 (Helen Keller & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2012). 
46 See U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, General Comment 
No. 24 (52), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.6 (Nov. 4, 1994), ¶ 7 (“The object 
and purpose of the Covenant is to . . . provide an efficacious supervisory machinery 
for the obligations undertaken.”).  See also Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, art. 40, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), UN Doc. A/6316 
(1966) (entered into force March 23, 1976) (envisioning the Committee as gathering 
reports from member States on the “measures they have adopted which give effect 
to the rights recognized” in the Covenant, studying these reports, and transmitting 
General Comments “as it may consider appropriate” and the reports to member 
States, all of which is seen as representing part of the object and purpose of the 
Covenant). 
47 THIRLWAY, supra note 36, at 17.  
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preparation of “unofficial codes of existing or desirable law,”48 
which presumably also would include reports of U.N. Special 
Rapporteurs.  Under Article 15 of the Statute of the International 
Law Commission, there are three stages of codification juridique: (1) 
the systematic restatement of rules that already exist; (2) the more 
precise formulation and systematization of rules that already exist 
but are somehow insufficient; and (3) the codification of a new rule 
or the substitution of an existing rule with a wholly new rule which 
is “considered by the person or body responsible for the codification 
as more satisfactory.”49  By analogy, it is the second stage of 
codification juridique that could give the content of the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur’s report considerable normative value for the United 
States and the People’s Republic of China, even though it might not 
be binding per se vis-à-vis both states.  Regardless of whichever line 
of reasoning one prefers, the U.S. and PRC laws relating to privacy 
and Internet surveillance will be assessed against the norms found 
within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the elaboration and 
systematization of these rules contained in the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur’s report. 
When it comes to the appropriateness of assessing U.S. and PRC 
laws in light of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, there appear to be no legal issues in relation to United States 
laws inasmuch as the United States is a state party to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United 
States has made no reservations that are relevant to privacy and 
Internet surveillance.50  Critics quickly will point out that the 
People’s Republic of China has no obligations under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because it is not 
a state party to the Covenant.51  Admittedly, the People’s Republic 
                                               
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 17–19. 
50 See U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Int’l Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights: Status of Ratification, Reservations and Declarations 
(Dec. 16, 1966), http://www.treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (listing the United States as one of 
the signatories of the Covenant). 
51 See, e.g., Vijay M. Padmanabhan, The Human Rights Justification for Consent, 
35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 10 (2013) (stating that China is not a party to the ICCPR); 
Katherine Tsai, How to Create International Law: The Case of Internet Freedom in China, 
21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 401, 402 (2011) (stating that the ICCPR is not a binding 
obligation upon China); Yutian Ling, Upholding Free Speech and Privacy Online: A 
Legal-Based and Market-Based Approach for Internet Companies in China, 27 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 175, 188–89 (2011) (“China has signed but has 
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of China is not a state party to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights inasmuch as it has not yet ratified the 
Covenant,52 although it is a signatory to the Covenant from having 
signed it on October 5, 1998.53  Article 18 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties indicates that signatories are “obliged to 
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of [the] 
treaty.”54  Therefore, the People’s Republic of China clearly has that 
obligation.  Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear what constitutes the 
“object and purpose” of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, although it is clear that the “object and purpose” 
cannot be the entire treaty itself or else there would be no point to 
the ratification process.55  It is difficult to see the provisions dealing 
with the right to privacy and the freedom of expression as 
constituting the “object and purpose” of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, which conceivably would be much 
larger than those more specific rights.56  Be that as it may, the 
People’s Republic of China still has binding obligations under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights through its 
consent to the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, which applied the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to Hong Kong.57  
The People’s Republic of China reiterated this consent when the 
National People’s Congress adopted the Basic Law of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of 
China through a resolution on April 4, 1990, which states in Article 
                                               
not ratified the ICCPR, which means it is not yet bound by the terms but should be 
making an effort to ratify it.”). 
52 But see Marton Sulyok, “In All Fairness . . .”: A Comparative Analysis of the Past, 
Present and Future of Fair Trial Systems Outside of Europe, 27 IUS GENTIUM 101, 128–29 
(2014) (mistakenly asserting that China has ratified the ICCPR). 
53 U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 50.  
54 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
55 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 582–83 (6th ed, 
2003) (describing the ratification process for such international covenants). 
56 But see Ping Xiong, Freedom of Religion in China under the Current Legal Frame-
work and Foreign Religious Bodies, 2013 BYU L. REV. 605, 609 (2013) (asserting that 
China’s ICCPR signature requires it to “respect, protect, and fulfil the freedom of 
religion”). 
57 See Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China 
on the Question of Hong Kong, U.K.-China, art. 3, para. 3, Dec. 19, 1984 (“The laws 
currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged.”); id. at annex I, 
sec. XIII (“The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
. . . shall remain in force.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
 
434 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:2 
39, “The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights . . . shall remain in force and shall be implemented 
through the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region.”58  As Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties makes clear, it is consent that creates treaty obligations on 
states,59 not necessarily full membership with a treaty regime.  
Therefore, the People’s Republic of China’s consent to the 
application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights in Hong Kong creates at least some binding obligations for 
the People’s Republic of China, and so it is valid to assess the 
People’s Republic of China’s actions in light of these obligations.  
This removes the need to argue that the People’s Republic of China 
has obligations similar to or equivalent to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights under customary 
international law,60 or through Kelsen’s type of monism where all 
international legal norms have weight for all states,61 although these 
remain valid options for arguing that the People’s Republic of China 
has obligations in this area.  Of course, this is not to say that the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights itself 
necessarily applies throughout the whole of the People’s Republic 
of China.  Rather, the People’s Republic of China has some 
obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and so must act in accordance with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights wherever it applies.  
The question then becomes whether the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights applies only to Hong Kong law, as 
opposed to all law that is applicable in Hong Kong, including PRC 
                                               
58 XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 39 (H.K.) [hereinafter Basic Law]. 
59 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
60 See id. at art. 38 (noting how “rules in a treaty becoming binding on third 
states through international custom); GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (1st ed. 1983) (asserting that the ICCPR “embodies and crys-
tallizes” customary international law); Ann Piccard, Women’s Rights are Human 
Rights Redux: Ain’t I a Human?, 26 J. C. R. & ECON. DEV. 753, 762–71 (2012) (explain-
ing how the ICCPR has become customary international law); Patrick Robinson, 
The Interaction of Legal Systems in the Work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 5, 17 (2009) (explaining that the fair-
trial rights of the ICCPR are customary international law); Jordan J. Paust, The Ab-
solute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate Sanctions, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 
1535, 1542 (2009) (explaining that the anti-torture rights of the ICCPR mirror cus-
tomary international law). 
61 See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 333–34 (Max Knight trans., 1967) 
(discussing legal, moral, and social norms for states).  
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law.  Basic Law Article 12 grants Hong Kong a “high degree of 
autonomy,” which allows Hong Kong to have its own legislative 
power, inter alia, in accordance with Article 17.62  However, this does 
not mean that PRC law does not apply in Hong Kong and that the 
applicable PRC law does not need to comply with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Indeed, Article 18 of the 
Basic Law provides, “National laws shall not be applied in the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region except for those listed in Annex 
III to this Law.”63  Annex III lists the following PRC laws, which 
apply in Hong Kong: 
 Resolution on the Capital, Calendar, National Anthem 
and National Flag of the People's Republic of China; 
 Resolution on the National Day of the People's Republic 
of China; 
 Order on the National Emblem of the People's Republic of 
China Proclaimed by the Central People's Government 
Attached: Design of the national emblem, notes of 
explanation and instructions for use; 
 Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of 
China on the Territorial Sea; 
 Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China; and 
 Regulations of the People's Republic of China Concerning 
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities.64  
This list has been amended on at least three occasions, in 1997, 1998 
and 2005,65 with Article 18 of the Basic Law providing the PRC 
Standing Committee the ability to “add to or delete from the list of 
laws in Annex III after consulting its Committee for the Basic Law 
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the 
government of the Region.”66  Therefore, at a minimum, the People’s 
Republic of China must assess these laws, as well as any PRC laws 
that might apply in Hong Kong in the context of a state of emergency 
under Article 18 and any PRC laws used by the National People's 
Congress when interpreting the Basic Law under its Articles 158 and 
                                               
62 Basic Law, supra note 58, at art 12, 17. 
63 Id. at art 18. 
64 Id. at Annex III. 
65 Id.  
66 Id. at art 18.  
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159, in light of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.  Basic Law Article 18(4) says that if the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress: 
decides to declare a state of war or, by reason of turmoil 
within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region which 
endangers national unity or security and is beyond the 
control of the government of the Region, decides that the 
Region is in a state of emergency, the Central People's 
Government may issue an order applying the relevant 
national laws in the Region.67  
It is reasonably foreseeable that the Internet-surveillance-related 
PRC laws discussed in Part 4 below presumably would be some of 
the first laws to be applied in Hong Kong in the case of a state of war 
or a state of emergency in the PRC’s effort to understand and control 
the flow of information in Hong Kong.68  
                                               
67 Id. at art 18(4). 
68 Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Tiaoli (政府信息公开条例) [Regulation on the Dis-
closure of Government Information] (promulgated by the St. Council, Jan. 17, 2007, 
effective May 1, 2008), http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-04/24/content_ 
592937.htm (China). There remains the possibility that the Standing Committee al-
ready has declared a state of emergency in response to the recent Umbrella Move-
ment, which would unlock the Central People’s Government’s powers to apply 
PRC laws in Hong Kong, including those relating to Internet surveillance. How-
ever, Article 6 of the Emergency Response Law requires the creation of “an effective 
social mobilization mechanism” in response to an emergency. ZHONGHUA RENMIN 
GONGHEGUO TU FA SHIJIAN YINGDUI FA (中华人民共和国突发事件应对法) [Emer-
gency Response Law of the People’s Republic of China], art. 6 (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007). This would remove the pos-
sibility of such a declaration of a state of emergency being kept secret, at least not 
for very long. Moreover, Article 9 of the Regulation on the Disclosure of Govern-
ment Information requires “administrative organs” such as the Central People’s 
Government to “publish information involving the immediate interests of citizens, 
legal persons or other organizations” and “a situation that requires the awareness 
or participation of the public.” ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHENGFU XINXI 
GONGKAI TIAOLI (中华人民共和国政府信息公开条例) [Regulation of the People's Re-
public of China on the Disclosure of Government Information] (promulgated by St. 
Council, Apr. 5, 2007).  See Laney Zhang, China: New Implementing Regulations of Law 
on State Secrets, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-new-implementing-regu-
lations-of-law-on-state-secrets/ (providing information on the Chinese govern-
ment’s new measures and outlining its major provisions).  Under Article 85 of the 
PRC Constitution, the Central People’s Government is the “highest organ of State 
administration.”  XIANFA art. 85 (1982) (China).  Therefore, it would appear that 
PRC law would not allow the Standing Committee or the Central People’s Govern-
ment to keep secret such a determination of a state of emergency and the applica-
tion of PRC law in Hong Kong. It is, thus, relatively safe to assume that these Inter-
net-surveillance-related PRC laws are not directly applicable in Hong Kong at this 
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All of this is to say that it arguably is appropriate to assess both 
U.S. and PRC Internet-surveillance-related laws in light of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
interpretations of the Covenant that have legal significance.  The 
remainder of this part elaborates on the exact provisions of the 
Covenant that relate to the right to privacy and the freedom of 
expression and some legally significant interpretations of those 
rights, which then are used to assess the Internet-surveillance-
related laws of the United States and the People’s Republic of China 
later in the article.   
 
2.2. Privacy and the Freedom of Expression 
 
Commentators assert that the right to privacy, which is 
implicated in Internet surveillance by state governments, is one of 
the most important human rights.69  Although the Internet is a 
relatively new technology that came into existence long after the 
establishment of the international law relating to privacy, the 
relevance of the laws relating privacy to the Internet is obvious.  As 
U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the 
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression Frank La Rue has 
asserted: 
By explicitly providing that everyone has the right to express 
him or herself through any media, the Special Rapporteur 
underscores that article 19 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the Covenant was drafted with foresight 
to include and to accommodate future technological 
developments through which individuals can exercise their 
right to freedom of expression.  Hence, the framework of 
international human rights law remains relevant today and 
equally applicable to new communication technologies such 
as the Internet.70 
                                               
point in time. 
69 See generally Alexandra Rengel, Privacy-invading Technologies and Recommen-
dations for Designing a Better Future for Privacy Rights, 8 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 117 (2013); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L.J. 475, 483 (1968); JAMES MICHAEL, 
PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY, WITH 
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 1–2 (1994). 
70 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 27, ¶ 21.  See also U.N. Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011), ¶ 
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Despite the perceived applicability of old laws to new technology, 
efforts to update legal instruments and create new laws that 
expressly refer to these new technologies should be encouraged.  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and ICCPR provide 
the fundamental international obligations when it comes to 
privacy.71  These two instruments essentially require member states 
to protect the exercise of the right to privacy and free 
correspondence, the right to freedom of expression, and the right to 
media.72 
 Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: 
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and 
reputation.  Everyone has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks.”73 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
provides as follows: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” 
The reference to “any media and regardless of frontiers” in 
Article 19 stands out when considered in the context of Internet 
surveillance.  Article 17 of the ICCPR represents an exact repeat of 
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but with 
some numbering added: “(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation.  (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks.”74   
                                               
12 (“[The ICCPR] protects all forms of expression and the means of their dissemi-
nation.”). 
71 See Andrew Hammond, Obama Needs to Repair Relations to Continue Fight 
against Terrorism, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 31, 2013 (reporting that, in light 
of the Snowden revelations about international NSA surveillance, “German and 
Brazilian diplomats have reportedly begun drafting a UN General Assembly reso-
lution calling for extending the [ICCPR] to [I]nternet activities.”). 
72 See generally Land, supra note 22, at 394; The Right to Privacy in the Digital 
Age, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/167 (Dec. 18, 2013). 
73 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)(A), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), at art 12 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights]. 
74 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI)(A), 
U.N. Doc A/RES/2200, at art. 12 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
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Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights are similar: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without 
interference. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; 
this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other media of his choice. 
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of 
this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities.  
It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these 
shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order 
(ordre public), or of public health or morals.75 
Article 19(2) of the ICCPR establishes “the right to freedom of 
expression,” including “freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either 
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of his choice.”76 Moreover, Article 19(3) provides several 
legitimate restrictions to safeguard the rights of others.77  This media 
clause creates the foundation for an emerging international law of 
the Internet, which guarantees the right to the technologies of 
connection, e-privacy and freedom of expression within the 
Internet.78  Among all those different labels and expressions of 
rights, the right to privacy is (or has been portrayed as) the most 
important one, both with regard to government surveillance and 
surveillance for commercial purposes.79  
The question arises how these provisions and rights are to be 
implemented.  According to ICCPR Articles 2(2) and 2(3)(a), state 
parties are obliged to take steps to adopt laws and measures that 
                                               
75 Compare Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 73, at art.19 with 
ICCPR, supra note 74, at art. 19. 
76 ICCPR, supra note 74, at art. 19(2). 
77 See id. at 19(3).  
78 Id. 
79 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 27, ¶¶ 53–59. 
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transform these international legal obligations into domestic laws.80  
The 2011 report of the Special Rapporteur on Key Trends and 
Challenges to the Right of All Individuals to Seek, Receive and 
Impart Information and Ideas of All Kinds through the Internet 
indicates that restrictions on the right to freedom of expression in 
Article 19 has to go through a three-part, cumulative test: 
a) It must be provided by law, which is clear and accessible 
to everyone (principles of predictability and 
transparency);  
b) It must pursue one of the purposes set out in article 19 
paragraph 3 of the Covenant, namely (i) to protect the 
rights or reputations of others, or (ii) to protect national 
security or of public order, or of public health or morals 
(principle of legitimacy); and 
c) It must be proven as necessary and the least restrictive 
means required to achieve the purported aim (principles 
of necessity and proportionality).81 
Concerning the first point, any restriction should be provided by 
(and only by) laws, which should clearly define the restriction and 
its application process.  Some key aspects to clarify include who can 
access the data and how it can be used, as well as the method of 
storage and the duration of storage.82  As the Special Rapporteur 
noted: 
The necessity of adopting clear laws to protect personal data 
is further increased in the current information age, where 
large volumes of personal data are collected and stored by 
intermediaries, and there is a worrying trend of States 
obliging or pressuring these private actors to hand over 
information of their users.83  
In general, the law needs to be crafted with adequate precision so 
that people can adjust their conduct in order to comply with the law, 
and the law must be knowable by the public, which are basic 
characteristics of law in general.84  As the Special Rapporteur 
                                               
80 ICCPR, supra note 74, at arts. 2(2), (2)(3)(a). 
81 Id. at ¶ 24. 
82 Id.  
83 Id. at ¶ 56. 
84 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–44 (1969).  
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clarified, those restrictions have to relate directly to the initial needs 
for the law in the first place.85  In sum, sufficient legal precision, legal 
clarity, and limited items of application are the basic criteria when 
assessing restrictions.86 
Second, the purpose of those restrictions is limited to the 
purposes listed in ICCPR Article 19(3).87  In particular, the basic 
arrangement of this distinction between rights and restrictions and 
between norms and exceptions must not be reversed.88  This point is 
reflected in ICCPR Article 5(1), which states: 
Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as 
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage 
in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of 
any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their 
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the 
present Covenant.89 
Any restriction must precisely point to the type of threat involving 
a basis provided in paragraph 3, thus creating a link between the 
threat and the type of expression.90 
Finally, the restriction should be necessary and in proportion 
with regard to its objectives.  In other words, there needs to be as 
                                               
85 See U.N. Human Rights Council, CCPR General Comment No. 27, Art. 12, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (Nov. 2, 1999), ¶ 13 (“The laws authorizing the applica-
tion of restrictions should use precise criteria and may not confer unfettered discre-
tion on those charged with their execution.) [hereinafter Comment No. 27].  
86 Vague and broad terms are clearly against this requirement, such as “pro-
moting division between religious believers and non-believers,” “defamation of re-
ligion,” “inciting to violation,” “instigating hatred and disrespect against the ruling 
regime,” “inciting subversion of state power” and “offences that damage public 
tranquility.” Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 27, ¶ 29. 
87 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 27, ¶ 25. 
88 Comment No. 27, supra note 85, ¶ 13. 
89 ICCPR, supra note 74, at art. 5(a). 
90 See U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Art. 19: 
CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011), ¶ 36 (“[I]n order for the Committee to carry out 
this function, a State party . . . must demonstrate in specific fashion the precise na-
ture of the threat to any of the enumerated grounds . . . that has caused it to restrict 
freedom of expression.”).  See also U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression, A/66/290 (Aug. 10, 2011), ¶ 16 (stating that General Comment No. 
34 on Article 19 “underscores that when a State invokes a legitimate ground for 
restriction of the right to freedom of expression, it must demonstrate in specific and 
individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat, the necessity and the pro-
portionality of the specific action taken, in particular by establishing a direct and 
immediate connection between the expression and the threat”). 
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few limitations as possible in order to encourage the free exchange 
of information on the Internet, with the exception of “a few . . . 
limited circumstances prescribed by international law for the 
protection of other human rights.”91  The consequence of this 
element is that it is absolutely clear that any disproportionate 
restriction would violate the Covenant.92  Moreover, ICCPR Article 
2(3)(a) sets out that there should be an effective remedy for any 
violation of the listed rights or freedoms, and the remedy should be 
determined by the designated authority within that state’s domestic 
legal system.93 
The Special Rapporteur also discussed the danger of states’ 
actions against individuals who communicate via the Internet, 
which a state might try to justify as being necessary for the purpose 
of combating terrorism or otherwise protecting national security, for 
example.  Even though international human rights law might not 
prohibit such actions, it is important to note how Internet 
surveillance often occurs due to political reasons, instead of security 
reasons, which is entirely inappropriate.94  
In sum, international law limits states in their efforts at Internet 
surveillance from the human rights perspective mainly through the 
right of privacy and the freedom of expression.95  In the end, these 
provisions of international law essentially try to balance the freedom 
of expression and other interests, such as public health, public order, 
and national security.  Restrictions on this freedom of expression 
must be in accordance with the principle of proportionality,96 “must 
                                               
91 Id. at ¶ 12. 
92 See DAN JERKER B. SVANTESSON, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
INTERNET 252 (2007) (discussing the ICCPR’s jurisdiction). 
93 ICCPR, supra note 74, at art. 2(3)(a). 
94 See Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 27, at ¶ 54 (“[S]urveillance 
often takes place for political, rather than security reasons in an arbitrary and covert 
manner.”). 
95 This article also recognizes that the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) provides protection for undisclosed 
information under Article 39(2) and its reference to actions that are “contrary to 
honest commercial practices.” See generally Robin J. Effron, Secrets and Spies: Extra-
territorial Application of the Economic Espionage Act and the Trips Agreement, 78 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1475 (2003); Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, The Internet, Cross-Border Trade in Ser-
vices, and the GATS: Lessons From US Gambling, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 319, 351–52 
(2006).  However, this article is delimited by focusing on the human rights aspects, 
not the trade-related aspects, which is reserved for future research on this topic.  
96 See MANFRED NOWAK, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR 
COMMENTARY 386–87 (1993) (maintaining that restrictions must be balanced against 
reason behind such restrictions).  
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be provided by law . . . and necessary.”97  Based on the dualism that 
dominates the international system,98 it should not come as a 
surprise if states have their own unique mechanisms and 
approaches to Internet governance, although this does not diminish 
the potential value in trying to harmonize these approaches.99  
Regardless of the success of harmonization efforts, the obligations 
described in this section continue to be applicable at the 
international level.  The next two parts describe the U.S. and Chinese 
laws concerning Internet surveillance, with the aim of comparing 
them with one another and with international standards to assess 
quality and compliance with these standards.  
 
3.  U.S. LAW ON INTERNET SURVEILLANCE 
 
The U.S. government conducts Internet surveillance either for 
national security or law enforcement purposes.  Distinct histories 
have led to generally separate legislative frameworks for national 
security and law enforcement, but the two categories are not 
mutually exclusive.  Both regulatory schemes are startlingly 
outdated and tend to limit the amount of individualized suspicion 
that the government must show before conducting surveillance.  
This part focuses on analyzing the existing and proposed legislation 
in light of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and 
relevant policy considerations in an effort to evaluate the validity of 
that legislation, especially in light of the international norms 
concerning predictability.  
 
                                               
97 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19(3); see also 
SVANTESSON, supra note 92, at 255. 
98 See ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 54–
81 (9th ed., 1992); LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS & VALUES 64–74 
(1995). 
99 See David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An Essay on Law-Making in 
Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 3, par. 10 (1995) (“One can imagine . . . bilateral 
agreements between network users).  See also Timothy S. Wu, Cyberspace Sover-
eignty?: The Internet and the International System, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 647, 654 (1996) 
(proposing ideas for a paradigm of effective cyberspace regulation); Lawrence Les-
sig, The Constitution of Code: Limitations on Choice-Based Critiques of Cyberspace Regu-
lation, 5 COMM. LAW. CONSPECTUS 181, 185–88 (1997) (analyzing various attempts to 
regulate cyberspace indirectly or regulating code directly). 
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3.1. U.S. Constitution and Statutes  
 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution forms the 
foundation of privacy protection in the United States:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.100 
This provision protects U.S. citizens from government action, but 
not from private-sector behavior.  However, in the private sphere, 
service providers fear the business impact of being compelled to 
disclose user data.101  Matters of law aside, the public perception that 
technology companies allowed the government to access personal 
data persists; and this perception has already cost industry players 
billions of dollars.102  In December 2013, Silicon Valley competitors 
formed a rare alliance to “address the practices and laws regulating 
government surveillance of individuals and access to their 
information.”103  The alliance created an ambitious set of principles 
to guide personal surveillance reform.  The principles call for 
oversight, accountability and transparency in government behavior, 
among other things; and the application of these standards prohibit 
bulk data collection of electronic communication and ensure due 
process in the courts that manage government data requests.104  
Perhaps most ambitious of all is the call for a “robust, principled, 
and transparent framework to govern lawful requests for data 
                                               
100 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
101 See Nicole Ozer, U.S. Sen. Dianne Feinstein’s NSA “Reforms”: Bad for Privacy, 
Bad for Business, THE SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 6, 2013,                                     
www.mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_24665551/aclu-diane-feinsteins-nsa-               
reforms-bad-privacy-bad (“[T]he U.S. cloud computing industry stands to lose as 
much as $35 billion as international customers find other cloud computing services 
rather than risk their sensitive data falling into the NSA’s giant maw”).  
102 See Claire C. Miller, Revelations of N.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech Companies, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 21, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-
from-snowden-hurting-bottom-line-of-tech-companies.html?_r=0 (“[T]he United 
States cloud computing industry could lose $35 billion by 2016 . . . . [T]he losses 
could be as high as $180 billion, or 25 percent of industry revenue.”).  
103 Global Government Surveillance Reform, Reform Government Surveillance, 
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across jurisdictions.”105  The degree of ambition embedded in these 
principles can be seen only when compared with the current federal 
legislation that regulates Internet surveillance, which the remainder 
of this section focuses on. 
The core federal statute regulating Internet surveillance by the 
government is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(“ECPA”) of 1986.106  Despite decades of technological advances, the 
legal framework currently upholding Americans’ privacy rights 
was written five years before the creation of the World Wide Web.  
The statute’s provisions are threefold.  First, the Act expands 
previously existing limitations on the government’s ability to 
wiretap to also restrict the live surveillance of online data.107  Second, 
the ECPA regulates the government’s use of “pen registers,” which 
are devices used to report outgoing telephone numbers.108  Finally, 
the statute’s most relevant provision, the Stored Communications 
Act (“SCA”),109 provides privacy rights for consumers who rely on 
email service providers, which the statue refers to as Electronic 
Communications Service (“ECS”) providers.110 It also protects 
consumers who use Remote Computing Services (“RCS”), or 
external storage and data processors.111 The SCA regulates when the 
government can force service providers to divulge users’ 
information and, as a separate matter, when information providers 
are permitted to provide the government with their data.112 
The SCA allows a service provider to disclose communications 
to an agency dealing with law enforcement “if the contents were 
inadvertently obtained by the service provider and appear to 
                                               
105 Id. 
106 Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22, 2701–12, 
3121–26 (1986). 
107 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22; Andrew William Bagley, Don’t Be Evil: The Fourth 
Amendment in the Age of Google, National Security, and Digital Papers and Effects, 21 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 153, 167 (2011) [hereinafter Bagley]. 
108 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3126; Bagley supra note 107, at 167. 
109 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712.  See Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communica-
tions Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 383 (2014) [hereinafter Kerr] (“But the most 
complex part of the [ECPA], and the part that has become by far the most important 
is . . . the Stored Communications Act.”). 
110 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1); Bagley, supra note 107, at 167. 
111 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)(2). 
112 Bagley, supra note 106, at 169.  See also Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 303 F. 
Supp. 2d 121, 124 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding that the government must follow the 
ECPA’s specific legal processes when attempting to obtain subscriber information 
from a service provider).  
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pertain to the commission of a crime.”113  The Act also allows a 
service provider to disclose communications to a governmental 
agency “if the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency 
involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person 
requires disclosure without delay of communications relating to the 
emergency.”114  The records of Electronic Communications Services 
or Remote Computing Services, unlike the communications, receive 
no protection from the Stored Communications Act.115 
The statute distinguishes between real-time surveillance and 
stored information, as well as between content and “non-content” 
data, with information relating to the actual content of messages 
receiving the most protection.116  The government must obtain a 
warrant, which requires probable cause, before compelling the 
disclosure of stored electronic data that has been on file for fewer 
than 180 days; however, if the content of an email is older than 180 
days, the government need only acquire a court order, which 
requires showing just “specific and articulable facts showing that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents . . . are 
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”117  This 
burden is more lax than the probable cause standard.  
For non-content information, such as the address, time, and 
location of sent messages, the government also may acquire a court 
order in place of a warrant.118  In United States v. Forrester,119 the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that non-content data 
such as e-mail headers and IP addresses were analogous to pen-
register data and therefore were unprotected by the Fourth 
Amendment.120 
When Congress passed the ECPA, its primary concern was to 
regulate the live monitoring of telephone communications in the 
forms of wiretaps and pen registers.121 Legislators also were wary of 
                                               
113 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(7) (2013). 
114 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(8). 
115 18 U.S.C. at § §2703(c)(3). 
116 See Kerr, supra note 109, at 385–86 (describing two amendments to the ECPA 
that distinguish between types of electronic information based on how the infor-
mation is stored and whether the information qualifies as content or non-content).  
See also Bagley, supra note 107, at 168 (providing further explanation of the differ-
ences between stored information and real-time information). 
117 18 U.S.C. §2703(d). 
118 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c). 
119 512 F.3d 500, 501 (9th Cir. 2007). 
120 Id. at 504. 
121 See Kerr, supra note 109, at 376 (“ECPA treated real-time wiretapping as the 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/1
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Remote Computing Services users, because before the invention of 
complex business software, companies out-sourced the majority of 
their financial information to third-party processors.122  However, 
given the contemporary accessibility of online storage, regulating 
Electronic Communications Service providers may actually be the 
ECPA’s most important function.  For example, many websites store 
content and non-content information of users on a permanent basis, 
and consumers are required to give that information to create an 
account in order to use the website.123 
Oren Kerr’s work on understanding and improving the ECPA 
has made a significant impact on the field.  In particular, Kerr points 
out a number of aspects of the SCA that leave the government ill-
equipped to give effect to the statute in modern times.124  The Fourth 
Amendment requires that warrants provide particular information 
about the area that is to be searched or property that is to be 
seized.125  However, no provision of the ECPA offers such guidance: 
if a service provider is permitted to disclose information, it may 
disclose any information in its possession, without being limited by 
time or limited to a certain user.126  Furthermore, the government is 
free to peruse, and act on, any bulk information it receives, 
regardless of the relevancy of that information to the original 
information request; this is known as the state action doctrine.127  
According to the state action doctrine, Fourth Amendment 
protections and limitations apply to third parties only when third-
party actions are linked to state actions.128  The most important case 
on the subject is Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., where the Court 
created a standard for deciding if the action of a private entity could 
be deemed state action.129  In particular, the Court determined that 
the actor must be involved in exercising “powers traditionally 
exclusively reserved to the State” for the private actor to be engaged 
                                               
chief privacy threat."). 
122 Id. at 383. 
123 Bagley, supra note 107, at 168. 
124 Kerr, supra note 109, at 390–401.  
125 Id. at 412. 
126 Id. at 383-84.  
127 Id. at 384. For reference to the state action doctrine, see Bagley, supra note 
107, at 185–87.  
128 See Bagley, supra note 107, at 185 (relying on Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 
465, 470–471, 475 (1921)). 
129 419 U.S. 345, 346 (1974).  See also Bagley, supra note 107, at 186 (outlining the 
Jackson court’s test to distinguish private actors from state actors). 
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in state action.130  The Jackson test is therefore a two-part test: the 
action must be that which is traditionally exercised by state actors 
and it must also be exclusively exercised by state actors.131  
Since Jackson, the Court has relaxed the requirements of state 
action, holding in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School 
Athletic Association that an athletic entity of a private nature that 
regulates public schools’ athletic programs actually are engaged in 
state action because the organization was entwined with the state.132  
In particular, the Court focused on the appointment by the state of 
the company’s directors.133 
The Courts of Appeals for the various circuits have interpreted 
these rules differently.  In United States v. Blocker,134 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit created an independent discovery 
exception to the post-Jackson understanding of state action, noting 
that a private actor working on behalf of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”) was not engaged in state action because the 
insurance records that it recovered would have been uncovered 
through a regular audit.135  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, conversely, enabled the finding of state action when it 
modified the Jackson test in United States v. Miller.136  The Court held 
that the determination of the existence of state action would be 
based on “(1) whether the government knew of and acquiesced in 
the intrusive conduct, and (2) whether the party performing the 
search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further its 
own ends.”137  Although the distinction between a private entity 
intending to assist law enforcement and furthering its own ends 
often is a false choice because government coercion aligns its 
interests with the interests of the private actor, this Article asserts 
that, as a means to protect personal information as “papers and 
effects” under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court should 
adopt this standard, and failing that, Congress should amend the 
Stored Communications Act to create this additional protection. 
                                               
130 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 346. 
131 Bagley, supra note 107, at 186. 
132 531 U.S. 288 (2001). Bagley, supra note 107, at 188. 
133 Bagley, supra note 107, at 188. 
134 104 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1997). 
135 Id. at 727; Bagley, supra note 107, at 189. 
136 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982). 
137 Id. at 657. 
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In addition to the issue involving state action, Congress has yet 
to update the statute in light of scientific progress, and as a result, 
the statute’s divisions between types of electronic data are difficult 
to apply to modern technology.  As Kerr writes:  
ECPA’s distinctions made sense in a world in which few 
records were created, few records were stored, and therefore 
few records could be obtained.  The statutory structure 
presumes an absence of Fourth Amendment protection and 
it also presumes a world of users, providers, and users all 
inside the United States.138  
According to Andrew William Bagley, the distinction between 
Electronic Communications Services and Remote Computing 
Services is outdated.  The SCA treats these two differently because 
“e-mail was originally stored only temporarily on third party 
servers when in route from sender to receiver.”139  While this 
distinction made sense historically, the use of cloud computing 
through services such as iCloud, Gmail, Yahoo! Mail and Hotmail 
leave non-content information dangerously exposed, because this 
information is kept permanently on the cloud and therefore non-
content information can be given to the government easily after 180 
days.  The solution to this problem is to amend the SCA to eliminate 
the outdated distinction between Electronic Communications 
Services and Remote Computing Services is eliminated and give 
both equal protection under the former Electronic Communications 
Service standard. 
As a statutory matter, the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act was not updated for law enforcement purposes until almost a 
decade after its adoption.  The Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act (“CALEA”), which Congress passed in 1994, 
enables law enforcement agencies to survey live communications.140  
Generally, CALEA requires telecommunications carriers to provide 
phone and Internet services that allow law enforcement officers with 
court orders to conduct surveillance.141  The statute, which required 
                                               
138 Kerr, supra note 109, at 390. 
139 Bagley, supra note 107, at 168. 
140 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1110 (2006).  See also Nathan C. Henderson, The Patriot 
Act’s Impact on the Government’s Ability to Conduct Electronic Surveillance of Ongoing 
Domestic Communications, 52 DUKE L.J. 179, 184 (2002) (detailing the Patriot Act’s 
effect on government surveillance and describing the role of CALEA in this regard). 
141 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE FOR 
LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT, www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/communications-assistance-
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carriers to update their technology, compels providers to allow the 
government backdoor access to users’ data.142  In 2006, after an FBI 
recommendation, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission 
extended CALEA to cover Voice-Over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP) 
communications, a technology that uses the Internet to make phone 
calls.143  More recently, in 2013, the FBI requested even further 
overhauls to allow law enforcement agencies real-time surveillance 
of email, instant messaging, and cloud computing services.144  In 
2010 and 2013, the FBI requested that Congress expand its authority 
under CALEA to “force all companies with messaging services to 
engineer their products with a secret government backdoor and to 
decrypt all encrypted messages.”145  According to James Dempsey, 
the Executive Director of the Center for Democracy & Technology: 
                                               
law-enforcement-act#introduction (last visited Feb. 9, 2015); Susan Landaum, Secu-
rity, Wiretapping, and the Internet, IEEE COMPUTER SOCIETY (2005), voip-billing-plat-
form.com/documentation/pdf/Internet_Security_and_Wiretapping.pdf; Hender-
son, supra note 140, at 184–85. 
142 Rebecca Jeschke, Plan for Internet ‘Backdoors’ Draws Coordinated Attack, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Oct. 16, 2005, available at http://www.eff.org/ 
deeplinks/2005/10/plan-internet-backdoors-draws-coordinated-attack. 
143 Mark Jaycox & Seth Schoen, The Government Wants a Backdoor Into Your 
Online Communications, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, May 22, 2013, available 
at http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/caleatwo (“CALEA forces telephone 
companies to provide backdoors to the government so that it can spy on users after 
obtaining court approval, and was expanded in 2006 to reach Internet technologies 
like VoIP.”).  See Micah Sher et al., Can They Hear Me Now? A Security Analysis of 
Law Enforcement Wiretaps, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH ACM CONFERENCE ON 
COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (2009), available at http://www.crypto. 
com/papers/calea-ccs2009.pdf (analyzing law enforcement wiretaps under 
CALEA and their susceptibility to attacks by the intercept target). 
144 See Ryan Gallager, FBI Pursuing Real-Time Gmail Spying Powers as “Top Pri-
ority” for 2013, SLATE, Mar. 26, 2013, www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/ 
03/26/andrew_weissmann_fbi_wants_real_time_gmail_dropbox_spying_power. 
html (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) (“[T]he FBI wants the power to mandate real-time 
surveillance of everything from Dropbox and online games . . . to Gmail and Google 
Voice.”). 
145 CALEA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Feb. 9, 2013, www.eff.org/          
issues/calea.  See also Kevin Bankston, Debate Over Internet Backdoors Heats Up in 
Congress and in Court, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Feb. 16, 2011, 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/02/congress-and-court-long-simmering-de-
bate-over (“[We think] that any expansion of CALEA would be the very definition 
of a bad idea, an ‘anti-privacy, anti-security, anti-innovation solution in search of a 
problem.’”); Seth Schoen, Government Seeks Back Door Into All Our Communications, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Sept. 27, 2010, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 
2010/09/government-seeks (“Trying to force technology developers to include 
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In some ways, interception might be less convenient, in that 
law enforcement may have to go to different entities to 
obtain content and routing information.  And given the 
diversity of services, the information will come in different 
formats and law enforcement will have to work harder to 
determine what it is intercepting.  In other ways, however, 
Internet surveillance will be easier, in that the digital nature 
of communications makes them easier to analyze, store, and 
retrieve.  Last year, for example, according to the 
government’s official Wiretap Report, out of 1,442 
authorized wiretaps nationwide, the ‘most active’ was the 
interception of a broadband Internet line.  The only question 
– and it’s a big question – is whether additional authority is 
needed for the government to insert certain features into 
Internet services to make them easier to tap.146 
The FBI is in the process of expanding law enforcement’s powers 
even further, such that agencies would have the ability to compel 
companies to comply or actually conduct wiretaps themselves.147  
The FBI’s request, which would strengthen the compliance 
requirements after the issuance of warrants, also would apply to 
foreign telecommunications providers operating in the United 
States and impose greater fines for noncompliance.148 
                                               
146 Law Enforcement Access to Communication Systems in the Digital Age: Hearing 
on H.R. Rep. No. 103-827 Before the H. Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the 
Internet, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 2 (2004) (statement of 
James X. Dempsey, Executive Director, Center for Democracy & Tech.), available at 
cdt.org/insight/law-enforcement-access-to-communications-systems-in-a-digital-
age/. 
147 18 U.S.C.§2518(4) (2013); Dempsey, supra note 146. 
148 See Charlie Savage, U.S. Weighs Wide Overhaul of Wiretap Laws, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/us/politics/obama-may-
back-fbi-plan-to-wiretap-web-users.html (“The Obama administration . . . is on the 
verge of backing a Federal Bureau of Investigation plan for a sweeping overhaul of 
surveillance laws that would make it easier to wiretap people who communicate 
using the Internet.”); Declan McCullagh, FBI: We need wiretap-ready Web sites – now, 
CNET, May 4, 2013, www.cnet.com/news/fbi-we-need-wiretap-ready-web-sites-
now/ (“The FBI is asking Internet companies not to oppose a controversial proposal 
that would require firms, including Microsoft, Facebook, Yahoo, and Google, to 
build in backdoors for government surveillance.”). An agency theory would be 
tested by the use of fines. With the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the 
U.S. Supreme Court rationalized that, even though Congress does not have the 
power to pass such legislation under its Commerce Power through use of fines to 
encourage performance, Congress does have such authority under its taxing power.  
Thus, this Act is only applicable to Americans who file taxes in the U.S.  See Ellen 
Nakashima, Proposal Seeks to Fine Tech Companies for Noncompliance with Wiretap Or-
ders, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2013, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-          
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One of the core issues involving the use of CALEA to engage in 
Internet surveillance is that it was not intended to be used for this 
purpose.  According to the testimony of Dempsey, CALEA was 
intended to be part of a Public Switched Telephone Network 
(“PSTN”), which it has not be successful as; instead, a new way must 
be created that is suited to the “decentralized, innovative 
Internet.”149  In his testimony, Dempsey focused on the differences 
between the public switched telephone network and the Internet 
noting that the Internet “supports not only voice, but also 
photography, data, and video.”150  Unlike the PSTN with its 
telephone operators, the Internet has no gatekeepers.151  Dempsey 
mentioned that “CALEA is a 20th century statute for 20th century 
technology” and that “CALEA was designed for the centralized, 
relatively monopolized, and circuit switched world of the 
traditional telephone common carriage – entities already subject to 
a range of regulatory burdens.”152  According to the Committee 
Report from the House Committee on the Judiciary, CALEA 
obligations “do not apply to information services, such as electronic 
mail services, or on-line services, such as CompuServe, Prodigy, 
America Online or Mead Data, or Internet service providers.”153  
According to the testimony of the Director of the FBI, CALEA was 
“narrowly focused on where the vast majority of our problems 
exist—the networks of common carriers, a segment of the industry 
which historically has been subject to regulation.”154  In 1999, the 
FCC determined that information services “such as electronic mail 
providers and on-line service providers” are exempt from 
CALEA.155  In United States Telecom Ass’n. v. FCC,156 the Court of 
                                               
security/proposal-seeks-to-fine-tech-companies-for-noncompliance-with-wiretap-
orders/2013/04/28/29e7d9d8-a83c-11e2-b029-8fb7e977ef71_story.html (describ-
ing legislation that would pressure tech companies to comply with government 
surveillance). 
149 Dempsey, supra note 146.  
150 Id.  
151 See id. (detailing government surveillance in the Internet Age). 
152 Id.  
153 Telecommunications Carrier Assistance to the Government, H.R. REP. NO. 
103–827(I), at 23 (1994) (quoted in Dempsey, supra note 146). 
154 Dempsey, supra note 146.  
155 In re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Second Report and 
Order, 15 FCC Rcd 7105, at 26 (1999) (quoted in Dempsey, supra note 146). 
156 227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/1
  
2015] INTERNET SURVEILLANCE IN THE U.S. AND CHINA 453 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that “CALEA does not cover 
‘information services’ such as e-mail and Internet access.”157 
Dempsey offered three approaches to government interception 
of Internet communication.  First, CALEA could be applied to the 
Internet as law enforcement agencies proposed in 2010 and 2013.158  
Second, a service bureau could operate as a middleman between law 
enforcement and the service provider, and the service bureau would 
unpack, extract, and format the information for the convenience of 
law enforcement.159  Third, law enforcement agencies could acquire 
the ability to glean information from packet streams.160  Dempsey 
advocates this third approach because, as he noted in his testimony 
to the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, 
“Even CALEA only requires carriers to deliver call-identifying 
information to law enforcement – it imposes no formatting 
requirements on service providers.”161 
Whereas Title III of the Wiretap Statute and the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act regulate domestic intelligence efforts, 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) of 1978 governs 
surveillance for national security purposes.162  FISA allows the 
government to conduct electronic surveillance and physical 
searches of both foreigners and U.S. citizens.163  Law enforcement 
agencies – namely, the FBI – can conduct wiretaps after showing that 
the focus of an operation is a member of a terrorist organization, a 
foreign power, or its agent.164  The government also must 
demonstrate that the investigation exists to detect “foreign 
intelligence information” and that it employs certain “minimization 
                                               
157 Id. 
158 See Dempsey, supra note 146. 
159 See id. 
160 See id. 
161 Id.  
162 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885(c) (2013), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 
STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf. 
163 Id.  See also Stephanie C. Blum, What Really is at Stake with the FISA Amend-
ments Act of 2008 and Ideas for Future Surveillance Reform, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 269, 
275 (2008) (“FISA provides a statutory framework for the U.S. government to en-
gage in electronic surveillance and physical searches to obtain ‘foreign intelligence 
information.’”). 
164 50 U.S.C. § 1084 (2013), available at it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=pri-
vacy&page=1286 (quoted in The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 
JUSTICE INFORMATION SHARING: U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, Sept. 19, 2013, https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLib-
erty/authorities/statutes/1286). 
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procedures.”165  FISA does not require the government to 
demonstrate that a crime is imminent in order to receive a warrant; 
the government only must show relevance to a terrorism 
investigation – probable cause that the person under surveillance is 
part of a terrorist organization or an “agent of a foreign power.”166  
Under Title III, the government has a higher burden – it has to 
demonstrate that there is probable cause that a search will uncover 
evidence that a target is committing, or has or will commit, a 
crime.167  
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”), founded 
by the statute, is tasked with overseeing the process by which 
executive agencies conduct surveillance for national security 
purposes.168  The FISC is composed of a panel of 11 judges, each of 
whom serves a 7-year term.169  The Court of Review, composed of 
three judges, hears appeals.170  U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice 
John Roberts appointed all of the Court’s judges unilaterally.  Title I 
of FISA requires the government to get judicial warrants from the 
court in order to conduct electronic surveillance to satisfy national 
security needs.171  Once an agency is granted a warrant, the statute 
includes no requirement that the agency reports its activities back to 
the court.172  
 On paper, the FISC’s procedural mechanisms seem to uphold 
due process norms.  As John Yoo observes:  
FISA obviously strikes a compromise between the wartime 
and criminal approaches to information gathering.  It . . . 
                                               
165 50 U.S.C. § 1084 (2013), available at it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=privacy& 
page=1286.  “Minimization principles,” according to the statute, are essentially pro-
cedures set by the Attorney General to ensure that the government does not dis-
seminate confidential information found during its investigations.  50 U.S.C § 1801 
(2013). 
166 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (2013). 
167 18 U.S.C. § 2516. 
168 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804–05. 
169 History of the Federal Judiciary: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER, www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_special_fisc.html 
(last visited, Nov. 9, 2015). 
170 Id. 
171 50 U.S.C. § 1804.  See also L. Rush Atkinson, The Fourth Amendment's National 
Security Exception: Its History and Limits, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1396 (2013) (“FISA 
requires that electronic surveillance during security investigations be conducted 
pursuant to judicial authorization.”). 
172 Jeremy D. Mayer, 9-11 and the Secret FISA Court: From Watchdog to Lapdog?, 
34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 249, 250 (2002). 
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bears strong resemblances to the criminal justice system, 
such as the requirement of an individual target, probable 
cause, and a warrant issued by a federal court.173  
Nevertheless, FISC’s results tell a different story.  In 2012, the 
government applied to the FISC on 1,789 occasions to be allowed to 
conduct surveillance of an electronic nature, and FISC granted every 
one of those requests.174  In fact, between 1979 and 2012, government 
agencies were granted 99.97% of all FISA warrant requests,175 which 
might suggest to some that FISC might not be the best at upholding 
due-process expectations.  
Recent information leaks have brought much criticism to two 
NSA programs.  One collects non-content information, or “meta-
data,” from around the world, and the other reads emails belonging 
to foreigners abroad.176  President Bush has admitted that he 
instructed the NSA to conduct surveillance as part of a Terrorist 
Surveillance Program (TSP) beginning after the attacks of September 
11, 2001 and ending in 2007.177  However, the story begins before 
former U.S. President George W. Bush.  In 1995, Congress expanded 
the government’s surveillance powers under FISA by allowing 
physical searches.178  In 1998, Congress also allowed the government 
to use trap-and-trace devices and pen registers to monitor 
surveillance targets.179  In 2001, President Bush signed the Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA 
Patriot Act”).  The USA Patriot Act, created for both national 
security and law enforcement purposes, firmly increased the federal 
government’s ability to seek out terrorist communications, as well 
                                               
173 John Yoo, The Legality of the National Security Agency’s Bulk Data Surveillance 
Programs, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 901, 905 (2014). 
174 Letter from Peter J. Kadzik to The Honorable Harry Reid, U.S. Department 
of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs (April 30, 2013), available at www.fas.org/ 
irp/agency/doj/fisa/2012rept.pdf. 
175 Conner Clark, Is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Really a Rubber 
Stamp? Ex Parte Proceedings and the FISC Win Rate, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 125, 125 
(2014) (citing Evan Perez, Secret Court’s Oversight Gets Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (June 9, 
2013), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424127887324904004578535670310514616).  
176 Yoo, supra note 173, at 901–02. 
177 Edward C. Liu, Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE, Apr. 8, 2013, at 4–5, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
intel/R42725.pdf. 
178 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821–29 (2013). 
179 50 U.S.C. at  §§ 1841–46 (2013). 
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as improved the working relationship between foreign intelligence 
investigators and criminal investigators, especially in relation to 
combating global terrorism.180  The statute permits the government 
to use pen registers on email communications and authorizes access 
to stored electronic records, as well as adds terrorism and computer 
crimes to the offenses included in Title III.181  Under the USA Patriot 
Act, the government can conduct surveillance without seeking court 
orders specific to the details of a given search.182  
Some of the USA Patriot Act’s provisions also amended FISA by 
lessening the burden required to acquire a FISC warrant.183  In 
particular, it was established that the FISA court may issue a warrant 
if foreign intelligence is “a significant purpose” of the investigation, 
not just “the purpose.”184 It expands the amount of time the 
government may conduct a search for national security purposes 
                                               
180 Charles Doyle, The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE, Apr. 5, 2002, at 1, available at www.fas.org/irp/crs/ 
RL31377.pdf. 
181 Id. at 5. 
182 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2013). According to § 2709, the Director of the FBI or assis-
tant director designee may request the “name, address, length of service and local 
and long distance toll billing records of a person or entity” if the Director or his 
designee may request these records if the records are “relevant to an authorized 
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
activities.”  18 U.S.C. §2709(b)(1).  These National Security Letters (NSLs) are con-
troversial, both because they are “widely used by the FBI to obtain data on Ameri-
cans without court oversight” and because companies that receive less than 1,000 
of these NSLs are prevented under the law from publicizing “both the content of 
the NSLs and to the very fact that they received one.” Ellen Nakashima, Justice De-
partment Walks Back Transparency on National Security Letters, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 
2014, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/11/13/justice-de-
partment-walks-back-transparency-on-national-security-letters/.  In 2013, Judge 
Susan Illston of the District Court of the Northern District of California held that 18 
U.S.C. § 2709 is unconstitutional as the statute’s gag provision violated First 
Amendment rights. National Security Letters Are Unconstitutional, Federal Judge Rules: 
Court Finds NSL Statutes Violate First Amendment and Separation of Powers, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Mar. 15, 2013, www.eff.org/press/releases/na-
tional-security-letters-are-unconstitutional-federal-judge-rules.  
183 See EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL40138, AMENDMENTS TO THE 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) EXTENDED UNTIL JUNE 1, 2015 1 
(2011) [hereinafter Liu] (detailing the FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act 
of 2012 and its government surveillance consequences). 
184 Jennifer L. Sullivan, From the Purpose to a Significant Purpose: Assessing the 
Constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act under the Fourth Amend-
ment, 19 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 379 (2005); see also William Funk, 
Electronic Surveillance of Terrorism in the United States, 80 MISS. L.J. 1491, 1501 (2011) 
(noting that the change in FISA’s requirement from “the purpose” to “a significant 
purpose” was done in light of allegations that “the purpose requirement had hob-
bled FBI intelligence and law enforcement cooperation”).  
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and adds four members to the FISC so that the panel now includes 
eleven judges.185  Notably, the Act also creates a claim mechanism 
for privacy violations committed by the government.186  The FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008 expanded the government’s surveillance 
powers relative to its powers under the 1978 statute.  Under these 
provisions, a court order is necessary only where a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists.”187  Reasonableness is determined 
according to both subjective and objective elements:  both the 
individual and society must recognize that an expectation of privacy 
existed in a particular case.188  Furthermore, the government needs 
not show FISC that the areas it intends to search are currently being 
used, or will later be used, by the target.189  Congress and the 
President extended the FISA Amendments Act until 2017, and the 
efforts of the ACLU and other advocacy organizations to challenge 
the Amendments Act ultimately were unsuccessful.190  
                                               
185 See Liu, supra note 183, at 15 (detailing the FISA Amendments Act Reauthor-
ization Act of 2012 and its government surveillance consequences).  Prior to 2008, 
FISA provided that the eleven FISC judges had to be from “seven of the United 
States judicial circuits.”  50 U.S.C. §1803(a).  A reading of this statute created a pos-
sible ambiguity in that it could be read to require that all eleven judges come from 
only seven judicial circuits. To address this ambiguity, the FISA Amendments Act 
of 2008 amended the statutory language adding the words “at least” before the 
word “seven.”  Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 109(a); ASHLING GALLAGHER, §5:3 THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT – THE FISC’S PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES, No. 2, 
(2013), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/2469--53-the-foreign-       
intelligence-surveillance-courtthe (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
186 See ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30465, THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND 
U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT AND U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE COURT OF REVIEW DECISIONS 1 (2007), available at fas.org/sgp/crs/      
intel/RL30465.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) (noting that the USA Patriot Act sub-
stantially expanded the reach of the business records provisions to provide a mech-
anism for production of any tangible thing pursuant to a FISA court order). 
187 Electronic Surveillance Within The United States For Foreign Intelligence 
Purposes, Pub L. No. 95–511 §101(f), 92 Stat. 1783 (1978).  
188 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (citing California v. Ciraolo, 
476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)). 
189 See EDWARD C. LIU,  CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42725, REAUTHORIZATION OF 
THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT 9 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/in-
tel/R42725.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) [hereinafter REAUTHORIZATION] (con-
trasting FISC with FISA by showing that FISA traditionally required an application 
to identify the facilities that will be searched or subject to electronic surveillance, 
and to demonstrate that those facilities are being used, or are about to be used, by 
the target). 
190 See REAUTHORIZATION, supra note 189, at 2 (“On December 30, 2012, Presi-
dent Obama signed H.R. 5949, the FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 
2012, which extends Title VII of FISA until December 31, 2017”).  
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In 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama signed the Patriot Sunsets 
Extension Act of 2011, which put four-year sunsets on roving 
surveillance, and the request for production of business records 
under Section 215.191  Unless the sunset clauses of these provisions 
are extended, they will expire on June 1, 2015.192  On December 31, 
2012, President Obama signed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (“FISA”) Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2012, which 
extends Title VII of FISA until December 31, 2017.193  President 
Obama pledged to cut the number of people under NSA 
surveillance by increasing the required proximity of those surveyed 
to an investigation.194  FISA and the USA Patriot Act both have been 
extended and reaffirmed by Congress and the President through 
2015 and 2017, respectively.195 
Some commentators argue that the president wields executive 
power to conduct warrantless searches without FISA and the USA 
Patriot Act.  For example, according to John Yoo, “FISA ultimately 
cannot limit the President’s powers to protect national security 
through surveillance if those powers stem from his unique Article II 
responsibilities.”196  To him, FISA actually is a Presidential “safe 
harbor,” guaranteeing that the surveillance is conducted within the 
bounds of the Fourth Amendment.197  Executive Order 12333, which 
was enacted by former U.S. President Ronald Reagan and expanded 
by former U.S. President George W. Bush, gives the U.S.  Attorney 
General wide-ranging power to approve methods of acquiring 
                                               
191 Under Section 206 of the USA Patriot Act, FISA was amended to add a de-
gree of flexibility in identifying the target of surveillance. Liu, supra note 183, at 1.  
Wiretaps that meet these revised generalized standards are called roving wiretaps 
because, to a certain extent, they move around and follow the designated target. 
192 Laura K. Donahue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional 
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 499 n.523 
(2012). 
193 REAUTHORIZATION, supra note 189. 
194 See Fred Kaplan, Pretty Good Privacy, SLATE, Jan. 17, 2014, at 2, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2014/01/ 
obama_s_nsa_reforms_the_president_s_proposals_for_metadata_and_the_         
fisa.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) (noting the reform decreased the number of 
“hops” that the NSA can make, in fanning out its surveillance, from three to two). 
195 REAUTHORIZATION, supra note 189; Jim Abrams, Patriot Act Extension Signed 
By Obama, HUFFINGTON POST POLITICS, July 26, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2011/05/27/patriot-act-extension-signed-obama-autopen_n_867851.html 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
196 Yoo, supra note 173, at 923.  
197 Id. at 930. 
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national security intelligence information.198  According to 
Executive Order 12333, intelligence agencies are to “collect, retain or 
disseminate information concerning United States persons only in 
accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency 
concerned and approved by the Attorney General, consistent with 
the authorities provided in part 1 of this order . . . .”199 Under 
Executive Order 12333, the following information is made available 
for collection, retention or dissemination:  “(a) [i]nformation that is 
publicly available or collected with the consent of the person 
concerned; (b) [i]nformation constituting foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence . . . ; [i]ncidentally obtained information that 
may indicate involvement in activities that may violate federal, 
state, local or foreign laws; and (j) [i]nformation necessary for 
administrative purposes.”200  It is this incidental obtaining of 
information that privacy advocacy groups such as the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) object to.201  According to EPIC, 
“Executive Order 12333 authorizes the collection of not only 
metadata, but of the actual communications of U.S. citizens, so long 
as the communications are collected ‘incidentally.’”202  EPIC also 
accuses the NSA of using Executive Order 12333 as a justification to 
intercept unencrypted data between Google and Yahoo’s data 
centers, and that has been verified by The Guardian.203  A recently 
declassified file produced by the Director of National Intelligence 
(“DNI”) and redacted prior to publication requires that all 
information incidentally acquired by intelligence officials be 
immediately destroyed unless:  “the Attorney General determines 
that the contents indicate a threat of death or serious bodily harm to 
any person” or if international communications contain 
“[s]ignificant foreign intelligence, or . . . [a]nomalies that reveal a 
potential vulnerability to U.S. communications security.”204 
                                               
198 18 U.S.C. §2511(2)(f) (2013); REAUTHORIZATION, supra note 189 at 3. 
199 Bazan, supra note 186, at 6. 
200 Id. at 6–7.  
201 Electronic Privacy Information Center, Exec. Order No.112333, available at 
epic.org/privacy/surveillance/12333/. 
202 Id.  
203 Id; Spencer Ackerman, NSA Reformers Dismayed After Privacy Board Vindi-
cates Surveillance Dragnet, THE GUARDIAN, July 2, 2014, at 3, www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2014/jul/02/nsa-surveillance-government-privacy-board-re-
port?CMP=ema_565 (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
204 LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND U.S. PERSONS MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, (U.S. NAT. 
SEC. AGENCY 2011), § 5.4, available at www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/ 
CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
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Executive Order 12333 has been extensively amended—by 
Executive Order 13284,205 by Executive Order 13355206 and by 
Executive Order 13470.207  Executive Order 13284 amends Executive 
Order 12333 by creating the Department of Homeland Security.208  
Executive Order 13470 amends Executive Order 12333 by formally 
unifying the intelligence community under the Director of National 
Intelligence (“DNI”),209 and the 2008 amendments to Executive 
Order 12333 include language acknowledging and protecting civil 
liberties such as the following: the Government “has the solemn 
obligation, and shall continue in the conduct of intelligence activities 
under this order, to protect fully the legal rights of all United States 
persons, including freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy rights 
guaranteed by Federal law.”210 
A general theme that can be unearthed from this recitation of 
data is that statutes concerning the right to privacy regarding papers 
and effects have changed in two fundamental ways.  First, modern 
statutes such as the USA Patriot Act have allowed for the use of 
modern technology to engage in traditional law enforcement 
activities.  Because of the increasing role of technology both from the 
perspective of the user and of law enforcement, legitimate questions 
can be raised as to the objectively reasonable expectation of privacy 
that the user has over those communications and that information.  
After all, if law enforcement has not entered into a constitutionally 
protected area over which an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy can be said to exist, no search has occurred and the Fourth 
Amendment protections are not implicated.  The second theme in 
modern statutes, especially the USA Patriot Act, is the increased 
collaboration between intelligence and law enforcement.  
Historically, greater invasions were permitted into the privacy of 
persons because of national security and the ability of intelligence 
agents and agencies to quickly and reliably access information has 
                                               
205 See generally 68 Fed. Reg. 4,075 (Jan. 23, 2003), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2003-01-27/pdf/WCPD-2003-01-27-Pg101.pdf (last visited Feb. 
9, 2015). 
206 See generally 69 Fed. Reg. 53,593 (Aug. 27, 2004). 
207 See generally 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325 (Aug. 4, 2008). 
208 See generally 68 Fed. Reg. 4,075 (Jan. 23, 2003), available at http://www.gpo. 
gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2003-01-27/pdf/WCPD-2003-01-27-Pg101.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 9, 2015). 
209 See generally 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325 (Aug. 4, 2008), available at http://www.gpo. 
gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2008-08-04/pdf/E8-17940.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
210 Id. at §2(1.1)(b).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/1
  
2015] INTERNET SURVEILLANCE IN THE U.S. AND CHINA 461 
prevented terrorist attacks.  The issues that this creates are two-fold.  
First, liberty and security should at the very least be viewed as a 
balancing test between competing interests.  Second, because of the 
collaboration between intelligence and law enforcement, law 
enforcement can now perform its function under a lower national-
security standard.  
With these points in mind, the following section explores the 
recent efforts at legislative reform when it comes to Internet 
surveillance.  Again, these reforms are assessed in light of 
predictability norms.  
 
3.2. Efforts at Legislative Reform 
 
A number of legislative efforts aim to update the existing 
regulatory scheme on government Internet surveillance.  This 
section outlines the major legislative efforts.  
3.2.1. The USA Freedom Act 
 
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), the Chair of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, and Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WIS), a USA 
Patriot Act author, have proposed an ambitious, bipartisan and 
bicameral legislative effort entitled the Uniting America by 
Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-Collection 
and Online Monitoring Act (“USA Freedom Act”).211  A reform bill 
called the USA Freedom Act is currently in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate.212  The Senate version of the Bill,213 
                                               
211 Patrick Leahy & Jim Sensenbrenner, The Case for NSA Reform, POLITICO,      
October 28, 2013, at 2, www.politico.com/story/2013/10/leahy-sensenbrenner-
nsa-reform-98953.html#ixzz2wqt0Bcm6 (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).  See also ACLU 
Strongly Supports Sensenbrenner-Leahy Bill Reforming NSA Surveillance Authorities, 
AM. CIV. LIBR. UNION, (Oct. 29, 2013), www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-
strongly-supports-sensenbrenner-leahy-bill-reforming-nsa-surveillance (last vis-
ited Feb. 9, 2015) [hereinafter ACLU] (“No longer will the government be able to 
employ a carte-blanche approach to records collection or enact secret laws by cov-
ertly reinterpreting congressional intent.”).   
212 Mark Jaycox, A Deep Dive into the House’s Version of Narrow NSA Reform: The 
New USA Freedom Act, Electronic Frontier Foundation, May 18, 2014, available at 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/05/us-house-moves-forward-narrow-nsa-
reform-after-year-eye-opening-revelations (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) [hereinafter 
Jaycox].  
213 S. 2685, 113th Cong. (2014). 
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sponsored by Senators Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WIS) and Patrick 
Leahy (D-VT), would close a current loophole that allows the NSA 
to engage in “warrantless searches for the phone calls or emails of 
law-abiding Americans,”214 bring more transparency to the FISA 
court and create an advocate for members of the public to represent 
them before the FISA court.215  Whereas the Senate version of the bill 
focuses on fixing section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act,216 the 
House version seeks to create additional transparency within the 
FISA court processes by allowing the FISA court to assign amicus 
briefs to be written by outside interested parties in important cases 
and to create reports that would track the number of accounts and 
customers who are affected by FISA court orders.217  The Senate 
version of the USA Freedom Act would amend the FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008 (“FAA”) by restricting searches of FAA-
collected data to non-U.S. persons unless there is an emergency or 
unless law enforcement receives a court order from the FISA 
court.218  The Act would curtail the government’s powers under the 
USA Patriot Act and would prohibit the bulk collection of data that 
Americans have shared with third parties.219  The Act also would 
weaken FISA powers by publicizing its opinions and creating a 
government advocate to guide its decision-making processes.220  
 
3.2.2. The FISA Improvements Act 
 
Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA) proposed the FISA 
Improvements Act,221 a bill that critics assert codifies the NSA’s 
                                               
214 James Ball & Spencer Ackerman, NSA Loophole Allows Warrantless Search for 
US Citizens’ Emails and Phone Calls, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 9, 2013, at 1, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-
searches-email-calls (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).  
215 Jaycox, supra note 212.  
216 Id.  
217 H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. § 401 (2013); Jaycox, supra note 212.  
218 Michelle Richardson, The USA Freedom Act is Real Spying Reform, THE 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION—WASHINGTON MARKUP, Oct. 29, 2013, 
http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/usa-freedom-act-real-spying-re-
form. 
219 Dustin Volz, Feinstein’s NSA Bill Is Officially on Life Support, NAT. J. (Dec. 8, 
2013), available at www.nationaljournal.com/technology/feinstein-s-nsa-bill-is-  
officially-on-life-support-20131218 (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
220 ACLU, supra note 211.  
221 S. 1631, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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existing practices.222  The bill would explicitly allow the NSA to 
search foreign communications for data pertaining to Americans.223  
Although Section 6 is entitled “Restrictions on Querying the 
Contents of Certain Communications,” it allows the intelligence 
community to search data not only for the purpose of gaining 
foreign intelligence information, but also for the broad purpose of 
assessing the importance of that information.224 However, the NSA 
would have to report its investigations in a record to Congress and 
various government agencies.225  Although the FISA Improvements 
Act of 2013 has made it out of the Senate Judiciary Committee with 
the support of the testimony of the Obama Administration,226 no 
further action has been taken on the bill.227 
 
3.2.3. E-mail Privacy Act and Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act Amendments Act of 2013 
  
The Email Privacy Act, the House companion bill to The 
Electronic Communications Privacy Amendments Act of 2013,228 
introduced by Representative Kevin Yoder (R-KS), Representative 
Tom Graves (R-GA) and Representative Jared Polis (D-CO), 
represents yet another bi-partisan effort to limit the government’s 
powers when it comes to surveillance.  The Act, an EPCA update, 
would prohibit service providers from disclosing email information 
to the government without a warrant, strengthen notice 
requirements by requiring that persons under surveillance receive a 
copy of that warrant within ten business days of the date of issue 
and remove existing distinctions between email that has been stored 
                                               
222 Volz, supra note 219; Spencer Ackerman, Feinstein Promotes Bill to Strengthen 
NSA’s Hand on Warrantless Searches, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 15, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/15/feinstein-bill-nsa-warrant-
less-searches-surveillance (last visited Feb. 9, 2015)[hereinafter Ackerman]. 
223 FISA Improvements Act of 2013, at §6, available at www.intelligence.sen-
ate.gov/pdfs113th/113fisa_improvements.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
224 Id. at § 6(1).  
225 Id. at §6(2).  See also Ackerman, supra note 222.  
226 Rainey Reitman, 54 Civil Liberties and Public Interest Organizations Oppose the 
FISA Improvements Act, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Dec. 18, 2013, 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/12/54-civil-liberties-and-public-interest-    
organizations-oppose-fisa-improvements-act (last visit Feb. 9, 2015).  
227 S. 1631, 113th Cong. (2013); FISA Improvements Act of 2013, available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1631 (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).  
228 S. 607, 113th Cong. §§ 2–6 (2013).   
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for more or less than 180 days.229  Despite reports that the E-Mail 
Privacy Act is gaining steam in the House, the bill has yet to even 
pass through the committee.230 
 
3.2.4. The FISA Accountability and Privacy Protection Act of 2013 
 
The FISA Accountability and Privacy Protection Act of 2013, co-
sponsored by Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-CN), Mike Lee, (R-
UT), Jon Tester (D-MT), Mark Udall (D-CO) and Ron Wyden (D-
OR), if passed, would have the following effects.  The Act would 
narrow the scope of court orders from the FISA Court under Section 
215 of the USA Patriot Act by demanding that the government show 
“both relevance to an authorized investigation and a link to a foreign 
group or power.”231  The bill also allows people to challenge non-
disclosure orders in court and expands reporting on the use of 
national security letters.232  The bill also would shift from June 2017 
to June 2015 the sunset date for the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 
(“FAA”).233  Finally, the bill would require the Inspector General to 
conduct a comprehensive review of the provisions of the FAA and 
its impact on the privacy rights of Americans234 and issue a yearly 
report to demonstrate such findings.235  The FISA Accountability 
                                               
229 See Email Privacy Act, H.R. 1852, 113th Cong. (2013), available at 
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1852#summary/libraryofcongress (up-
dating the “privacy protections for electronic communications information that is 
stored by third-party service providers in order to protect consumer privacy inter-
ests while meeting law enforcement needs”). 
230 See Kate Tummarello, An End to Warrantless Email Searches?, THE HILL BLOG, 
Mar. 2, 2014, available at thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/199625-
support-builds-in-house-for-ending-warrantless-email#ixzz2wqgxfjMi (describing 
the obstacles erected by civil agencies for the bill).  
231 See Zach Miners, New Privacy Bill Aims at Reforming FISA and the Patriot Act, 
INFOWORLD, (June 25, 2013), www.infoworld.com/article/2610911/federal-           
regulations/new-privacy-bill-aims-at-reforming-fisa-and-the-patriot-act.html (de-
scribing the effects of the provisions of the FISA Accountability and Privacy Protec-
tion Bill of 2013).  
232 Id. 
233 Id.  
234 Id.  
235 See Dana Liebelson, Google, Yahoo, Facebook, and Twitter Have a New Lobbying 
Target—the NSA, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/ 
politics/2013/11/nsa-bills-google-facebook-yahoo-twitter-lobbying (listing the 
eight “pro-transparency” bills most watched by the tech industry).  
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and Privacy Protection Act was referred to committee in 2013 and 
no further action has been taken on the bill.236 
Two general themes of the reform legislation are, first, an 
attempt at increasing the proportionality of government 
surveillance with the necessity of counter-terrorism operations and, 
second, an increase in the transparency of the government 
surveillance process.  Arguably, widespread Internet surveillance is 
necessary to protect the people from terrorism and other threats; 
however, to be in accordance with the standards of international 
law, those measures must be proportional to necessity.  Whereas the 
Senate version of the USA Freedom Act, the E-mail Privacy Act and 
the FISA Accountability and Privacy Protection Act of 2013 each act 
to increase the proportionality of the surveillance to the necessity of 
it, the House version of the USA Freedom Act and the FISA 
Improvements Act, along with the other three bills, act to increase 
the transparency of the government surveillance processes.  
 This section has explored and analyzed the U.S. legislation 
concerning Internet surveillance with an eye to assessing 
predictability.  The following section analyzes U.S. case law with the 
same purpose.  
 
3.3. U.S. Case Law 
 
Historically, Fourth Amendment queries were based upon a 
theory of trespass, which required physical entry.237  U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice Louis Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead was one of the first 
incarnations of the idea of a reasonable expectation of privacy, and 
this idea was canonized by the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Katz v. United States.238  In Katz, the Court abandoned the 
                                               
236 See FISA Accountability and Privacy Protection Act of 2013, S. 1215, 113th 
Cong. (2013), available at www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1215 (improving 
protections for privacy rights while increasing oversight of federal surveillance pro-
grams).  
237 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that the 
wire-tapping of defendant’s phone conversations did not constitute a violation of 
his constitutional rights). 
238 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967) (holding Fourth 
Amendment protections to be applicable to all areas where citizens have reasonable 
expectations of privacy).  See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 
(1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applies not only to searches for evi-
dence regarding a criminal prosecution but instead applies to all government 
searches); William Funk, Electronic Surveillance of Terrorism in the United States, 80 
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restriction of Fourth Amendment protections to literal “persons, 
houses, papers and effects”239 and created the following test: first, 
did the person have a subjective expectation of privacy under the 
circumstances and according to the view of the Court, and second, 
was the person’s expectation of privacy objectively reasonable 
under the circumstances?240  This objective test created by Justice 
Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz created what Jed Rubenfeld 
refers to as a logical trap of circular reasoning and self-validation.241  
If a means of government surveillance becomes common 
knowledge, people no longer have an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy with regard to information thus put under 
surveillance.  This also implicates the predictability principle.  The 
court’s main weapon against this trap of logic is what many authors 
have referred to as the Stranger Principle.242  There are two questions 
that one must ask when defining what an objective reasonable 
expectation of privacy is.243  First, how should law enforcement act 
if law enforcement was a stranger?244  Second, if law enforcement 
was not present or not in surveillance, what would we have exposed 
to perfect strangers?245  Rubenfeld argues that the second question 
is more important.246  In essence, the Stranger Principle (which 
removes Fourth Amendment protection from information 
voluntarily given to third parties) is the only cure for the circular 
reasoning created by the objective reasonable expectation of privacy 
                                               
MISS. L. J. 1491, 1493–94 (2011) (arguing that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act is a reasonable compromise between privacy concerns and security interests in 
the age of international terrorism). 
239 U.S. Const. amend. IV.  See also Nathan C. Henderson, The Patriot Act’s Im-
pact on the Government’s Ability to Conduct Electronic Surveillance of Ongoing Domestic 
Communications, 52 DUKE L. J. 179, 181–82 (2002) (describing Katz’s role in overruling 
Olmsted and Justice Harlan’s necessary conditions for Fourth Amendment protec-
tions). 
240 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Justice Harlan concurring). For ex-
amples of this test being used, see generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
241 See Rubenfeld, supra note 9, at 103-04 (describing the most obvious prob-
lems with “expectations-of-privacy” analysis). 
242 See id. at 107, 110 (explaining the Stranger Principle as: “to the extent we 
have opened something otherwise private to a perfect stranger, the police may in-
trude as well”).  
243 See id. at 109 (noting the pitfalls associated with erroneous definitions of 
“objective reasonable expectations” of privacy). 
244 See id. at 109–10 (describing the “reasoning like a stranger” question). 
245 See id. at 110–11 (describing the Stranger Principle). 
246 See id. at 109 (emphasizing the importance of the Stranger Principle). 
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test, and it also effectively kills Fourth Amendment protection of 
information, especially in the modern era.247 
This objective test for reasonableness relies substantially on the 
common access to and use of technology to create the expectation of 
privacy.  Katz v. United States and Kyllo v. United States are good 
examples.248  Katz involved the use of a phone booth to engage in 
illegal activity, whereas Kyllo involved the use of a thermal imaging 
device by the police to detect the growing of marijuana plants in 
someone’s home.  Read together, these cases stand for the 
proposition that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
over certain things and over certain areas depending upon the 
circumstances, and law enforcement can only use ordinarily-
accessible means to access protected information without a warrant.  
Most relevant for this discussion is the effects of modern technology 
and notice on surveillance.  
In three important recent cases, United States v. Jones,249 Riley v. 
California, 250 and Klayman et. al. v. Obama et. al.,251 the courts have 
distinguished those cases from presumably controlling precedent 
on the grounds that the difference in technology allowed for a more 
intrusive invasion of privacy and therefore a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.  The following sub-sections analyze those 
cases.  
                                               
247 See generally id.  
248 In Katz, the Court held that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a phone booth against a phone tap. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Kyllo, the Court 
held that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home against 
a thermal imaging device used by the police because those devices are not readily 
available to members of the public. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). Using Katz as an analogy, the 
Internet is becoming an increasingly common means for people to access and trans-
mit information. Therefore, people should have an increasingly reasonable expec-
tation of privacy that the information that they access and the information that they 
transmit on the Internet will not be accessible to the government and to law en-
forcement without a warrant. Using Kyllo as an analogy, the means by which the 
government engages in Internet and telephone surveillance is not commonly acces-
sible to members of the public – for example, using super-computers that can store 
meta-data. Therefore, people should have an objective reasonable expectation of 
privacy that access and transmission of information will not be accessible to the 
government or to law enforcement without a warrant. 
249 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (holding that the attach-
ment of a tracking device on a vehicle constitutes a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment). 
250 See Riley v. California 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (holding that search war-
rants for cell phone data cannot be dispensed with on the basis of officer safety or 
evidence preservation). 
251 957 F.Supp.2d 1, 29 (D.D.C. 2013).  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
 
468 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:2 
 
3.3.1. United States v. Jones 
 
United States v. Jones and United States v. Maynard are companion 
cases.  Jones and Maynard were convicted of conspiracy to 
distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine.252  One 
of the means by which the police became aware of information used 
to indict and eventually convict the defendants was the use of GPS 
tracking technology.253  Jones, but not Maynard, argued that his 
conviction should be overturned because the police violated the 
Fourth Amendment by engaging in an unreasonable search when 
the police used GPS technology to track his movements twenty-four 
hours a day for twenty-eight days without a warrant.254  The 
government argued that United States v. Knotts255 is controlling, but 
the D.C. Circuit Court disagreed.  In Knotts, the Court held that “[a] 
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place 
to another.”256  
In distinguishing Knotts from Jones, the D.C. Circuit Court, and 
later the Supreme Court, focused on the duration and scope of the 
search, or as Kerr calls it, the mosaic theory of the Fourth 
Amendment.257  This approach can be contrasted with a sequential 
approach to determining whether or not and at what time a search 
occurs.258  Under the historical sequential approach to Fourth 
Amendment analysis, each action of law enforcement is judged on 
an individual basis to determine whether such action constitutes 
inside or outside surveillance.259  Law enforcement entrance into a 
place where people have a reasonable expectation of privacy (or 
                                               
252 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 548 (D.C. Cir, 2010) (holding 
that warrantless placements of GPS tracking devices on motor vehicles constitute 
searches).  
253 Id. at 560. 
254 Id. 
255 615 F. 3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir, 2010). 
256 Id. at 561 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)). 
257 See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012). 
258 See id. at 313 (characterizing the “mosaic theory” of the Fourth Amendment 
as an analysis that emphasizes the collective sequence of steps over time). 
259 See id. at 316 (describing the “historical sequential approach”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/1
  
2015] INTERNET SURVEILLANCE IN THE U.S. AND CHINA 469 
inside surveillance) constitutes a search.260  Judge Ginsburg 
reasoned in Maynard that “dragnet-type” law enforcement 
practices” might trigger “different constitutional principles.”261  This 
means that the courts likely will distinguish in the future, as they 
have in the past, between the scope of the investigation made 
broader by modern technology. 
  
3.3.2. Riley v. California 
 
In Riley v. California, a unanimous Supreme Court held that 
“[t]he police generally may not, without a warrant, search digital 
information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been 
arrested.”262  The respondents relied upon two main arguments to 
justify the warrantless searches of Riley and Wurie (a companion 
case).  First, cell phones are compact and can be carried on 
someone’s person, therefore they can be searched incident to a 
lawful arrest.263  The second argument used by the respondents to 
justify a warrantless search of cell phones is that cell phones are 
materially indistinguishable from land line phones and therefore 
data on cell phones can be searched (for instance call logs) because 
that information is given to the mobile phone carrier and therefore 
the Stranger Principle is implicated.264 
In Chimel v. California, the Supreme Court held that a search of 
an arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control” is 
reasonable and therefore a warrant for such a search is not 
                                               
260 See id. at 316–17 (framing reasonable searches as observation, and unrea-
sonable searches as involving some type of entrance into an enclosed, private 
space). To the extent that a trespass of chattels theory still is used to determine the 
existence of a search, such as in Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in United States 
v. Jones, such a theory is best understood as part of the sequential approach. Kerr, 
supra note 257, at 317. 
261 Id. at 324 (quoting United States v. Maynard, 615 F. 3d at 556–58). 
262 Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2480. 
263 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 757 (1969) (holding that police officers 
arresting a person in their place of residence can only search the area within the 
immediate reach of the person); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) 
(holding that personal searches of the arrested is allowed by the Fourth Amend-
ment); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (holding that the arresting officers 
must show a physical threat posed by the arrested or the potential destruction of 
evidence in order to justify a vehicular search without a warrant after the vehicle’s 
occupants have been arrested). 
264 Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2493. 
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required.265  The rationales that the Court used to come to this 
conclusion were the protection of the arresting officers’ safety and 
the preservation of evidence.266  In United States v. Robinson, the 
Court abandoned the arresting officers’ safety and preservation of 
evidence rationales and adopted a categorical rule that all searches 
incident to a lawful arrest are inherently reasonable and therefore a 
warrant is not necessary.267  In Arizona v. Gant, the Court extended 
the Chimel doctrine to the warrantless search of a vehicle’s passenger 
compartment “when it is reasonable to believe that evidence 
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”268  
In Riley, the Court rejected the Chimel considerations of officer 
safety and preservation of evidence as applicable to cell phones and 
abandoned the categorical rule that it had embraced in Robinson.269  
The Court in Riley also clarified that the claimed extension of Chimel 
to Gant was not an extension at all; rather, the search was found to 
be reasonable because of “circumstances unique to the vehicle 
context.”270  In other words, a search of the passenger compartment 
of a car was deemed to be reasonable absent a warrant, not because 
the search happened incident to a lawful arrest, but rather because 
the search was deemed reasonable due to the added exigency of 
searching an automobile. 
The Court in Riley found importance in the special nature of cell 
phones, noting that “a cell phone collects in one place many distinct 
types of information . . . ;  a cell phone’s capacity allows even just 
one type of information to convey far more than previously 
possible . . . ;  the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of 
the phone, or even earlier. . . ;  [and] there is an element of 
pervasiveness that characterizes cell phones, but not physical 
records.”271  The Court in Riley effectively analogized cell phones, 
especially smart phones, to computers, thereby eliminating the 
                                               
265 Chimel, at 762–63 (1969). 
266 See id. at 763, 768 (explaining the logic behind allowing officers to search the 
immediate vicinity of the offender). 
267 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment allows such searches under the auspices of reasonableness). 
268 Arizona v. Grant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (quoting Thornton v. United States, 
541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J. concurring in judgment). 
269 Riley v. California, 134 U.S. 2473, 2481–82 (2014). 
270 Grant, 556 U.S. at 343. 
271 Riley, 134 U.S. at 2490–91. 
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problem of the Stranger Principle and the precedent of Smith v. 
Maryland.272  
Not only is modern surveillance technology changing the courts’ 
approach to Fourth Amendment law, but so are the revelations of 
those means of surveillance leaked by The Guardian and Edward 
Snowden.  In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, NGO groups 
contested the constitutionality of Section 702’s warrantless 
surveillance.273  Their effort was appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, which dismissed the case for lack of standing.274  A 5–4 
majority held that the plaintiffs, who were U.S. citizens who 
believed themselves likely targets of Section 1881 surveillance, could 
not show that they had suffered harm that was “concrete, 
particularized, and actual or imminent.”275  As Adam Liptak of the 
New York Times noted, “[T]he ruling illustrated how hard it is to 
mount court challenges to a wide array of antiterrorism measures . . 
. in light of the combination of government secrecy and judicial 
doctrines limiting access to the courts.”276 
 
3.3.3. Klayman et al v. Obama et al. 
 
In Klayman et. al. v. Obama et. al., the Court held that the plaintiffs 
had standing to sue on constitutional grounds, specifically on the 
question of whether Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act was 
constitutional based on Fourth Amendment standards and 
additionally held that Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act was 
unconstitutional.277  As for the standing argument, Judge Leon 
reasoned that Klayman is different from Clapper in that the plaintiffs 
in Clapper were unaware at the time of the suit (prior to Snowden’s 
NSA revelations) of the scope of NSA surveillance and therefore the 
                                               
272 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 745–46 (1979) (holding that a person 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy with phone numbers given to a third party 
- in this case the telephone company). 
273 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,133 U.S. 1138 (2013). 
274 For other cases dismissed for lack of standing involving FISA, see Mayfield 
v. United States, 588 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that because the appellees 
signed a settlement agreement in which they agreed to not seek injunctive relief, 
the appellees lacked standing). 
275 Clapper, 133 U.S. at 1138. 
276 Adam Liptak, Justices Turn Back Challenge to Broader U.S. Eavesdropping, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/us/politics/supreme-court-
rejects-challenge-to-fisa-surveillance-law.html. 
277 See Klayman et al. v. Obama et al., 957 F.Supp.2d 1, 29 (D.D.C. 2013).  
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likelihood that the NSA would have such information.278  The 
Klayman plaintiffs, however, filed suit shortly after Snowden’s 
revelations became public and therefore, according to Judge Leon, 
“can point to strong evidence that, as Verizon customers, their 
telephony metadata has been collected for the last seven years (and 
stored for the last five) and will continue to be collected barring 
judicial or legislative intervention.”279 
Given the recent ruling in Klayman, it is difficult to agree with 
the assumption that the courts will hold knowledge of surveillance 
against the people when it comes to defining what is and what is not 
a reasonable expectation of privacy.  In fact, if Klayman proves 
anything, it is that the more we know about the surveillance used 
against us as people, the more protections we are provided by the 
courts.  This is especially true with regard to standing, but might not 
prove to be true with regard to Fourth Amendment claims. 
 
3.3.4. The ECPA Cases and the SCA Cases 
 
The Stored Communications Act’s first constitutional challenge 
came in the 2007 case of United States v. Warshak.280  Steven Warshak, 
who ran a nutrition supplement company, allegedly committed a 
number of crimes relating to money laundering and fraud.281  In 
investigating the case, the government requested that Warshak’s 
Internet service provider (“ISP”) store his emails and eventually 
turn them over to investigators; it was after the government used 
incriminating information from his email history to convict him that 
the case reached the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.282  
The Court held that Warshak’s email was subject to Fourth 
Amendment protections, such that the government must show 
probable cause, in the form of a warrant, before accessing his data.283  
According to the Court, Warshak’s subjective expectation of privacy 
in his email communications was objectively reasonable.284  He 
                                               
278 See id. at 26. 
279 Id.  
280 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).  
281 Id. at 274. 
282 Id. at 282.  See generally Courtney M. Bowman, A Way Forward After Warshak: 
Fourth Amendment Protections for E-mail, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809 (2012).  
283 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288. 
284 Id.  
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“plainly manifested an expectation that his emails would be 
shielded from outside scrutiny,” and his belief was deemed 
reasonable because “[g]iven the fundamental similarities between 
email and traditional forms of communication, it would defy 
common sense to afford emails lesser Fourth Amendment 
protection.”285  Importantly, the Sixth Circuit also held the Stored 
Communications Act to be unconstitutional, insofar as it allowed the 
government to acquire information without a warrant.286  Still, 
because officers acted in good faith based on a provision that was 
not obviously unconstitutional, the acquired evidence was still 
admissible in Warshak’s criminal conviction.287 
These cases tell us that hope for greater privacy under the Stored 
Communications Act is more likely to come from Congress than 
from the courts. 
 
3.3.5. The FISA Cases 
 
In United States v. Duggan, the appellants argued inter alia that 
FISA violates the probable-cause clause of the Fourth Amendment, 
that FISA was used to conduct a criminal investigation, and that 
doing so is an impermissible construction of the authority conferred 
by the statute.288  According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit:  
 
[T]he President had the inherent power to conduct 
warrantless electronic surveillance . . . and that such 
surveillances constituted an exception to the warrant 
                                               
285 Id. at 285. 
286 Id. at 288. 
287 Since 2010, other federal courts have applied Warshak’s standard.  See, e.g., 
Kerr, supra note 109, at 401–02 (citing United States v. Ali, 870 F. Supp. 2d 10, 39 
(D.D.C 2012) (noting the difficulty in applying Fourth Amendment protection to 
complex sets of emails that may include nonmaterial information); State v. Hinton, 
280 P.3d 476, 483 (Wash.App. Div. 2 2012) (noting the court’s finding that an email 
subscriber has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of emails); In re 
Applications for Search Warrants for Information Associated with Target Email Ac-
counts/Skype Accounts, 2012 WL 4383917, at *5 (D.Kan. 2012) (noting a two-part 
test to determine whether the expectation of privacy is reasonable)). 
288 United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73–74 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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requirement. . . . Congress passed FISA to . . . ‘remove any 
doubt as to the lawfulness of such surveillance.’”289  
In response to the impermissible-construction argument, the court 
turned to the legislative history of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, specifically the Senate Report, noting that 
“intelligence and criminal law enforcement tend to merge in [the 
area of foreign counterintelligence investigations]” and that 
“[s]urveillances conducted under [FISA] need not stop once 
conclusive evidence of a crime is obtained, but instead may be 
extended longer where protective measures other than arrest and 
prosecution are more appropriate.”290 
In United States v. Damrah, Damrah argued that the FISA 
surveillance review procedures violated his constitutional rights.291  
In particular, Damrah argued that the Due Process Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution required an evidentiary hearing and that the ex parte 
review provided by the district court was unconstitutional.292  The 
court held that the FISA procedures were consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment.293 
In In re Sealed Case,294 the United States Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court of Review (“The Court of Review”) reviewed a 
decision by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) that 
partially denied an application to authorize electronic surveillance 
where “a significant purpose” of the surveillance was to gather 
intelligence information.295  The Court of Review held that the FISC 
ignored the effects of the USA Patriot Act on coordination between 
law enforcement and intelligence made possible by the change in 
statutory language from “the purpose” to “a significant purpose.”296  
                                               
289 Id. at 72–73. 
290 See id. (“FISA reflects both Congress’s ‘legislative judgment’ that the court 
orders and other procedural safeguards laid out in the Act ‘are necessary to ensure 
that electronic surveillance by the U.S. Government within this country conforms 
to the fundamental principles of the fourth amendment.’”) (quoting 1978 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Ad. News 3979–80). 
291 United States. v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618, 623–624 (6th Cir. 2005). 
292 Id. at 623. 
293 Id. at 625. 
294 In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 735 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).  See also 
Michael P. O’Connor & Celia Rumann, Going, Going, Gone: Sealing the Fate of the 
Fourth Amendment, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1234, 1237–39 (2002–03) (discussing the 
importance of this case). 
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In United States v. Abu-Jihaad, Abu-Jihaad, a sailor with the U.S. 
Navy, was convicted of communicating national defense 
information concerning the movements of a United States Navy 
battle group to unauthorized persons.297  He appealed his conviction 
on the grounds that FISA is unconstitutional on its face as a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment and that the statute’s requirements were 
not met in the case.298  Abu-Jihaad argued that the primary-purpose 
requirement is essential to the constitutionality of FISA.299  Absent 
such a restriction, the government may misuse the statute to procure 
warrants for criminal investigations without demonstrating the 
probable cause essential to that latter purpose.300  An important case 
relied upon by the Court in Abu-Jihaad is the U.S. Supreme Court 
case United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan.301  This case is typically referred to as the Keith case, in 
reference to the last name of the federal district judge in the case.302 
In Keith, the Court determined that a judicial warrant is required 
to be issued before the government may engage in wiretapping or 
other forms of surveillance of threats involving national security.303  
This holding was expressly restricted to “the domestic aspects of 
national security[.]”304  Therefore, the Court’s reliance upon this case 
in Abu-Jihaad is inappropriate.  The rationale of Judge Keith was as 
follows: “Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be 
guaranteed if domestic security surveillance may be conducted 
solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch.”305  The case 
law pertaining to Fourth Amendment protections of papers and 
effects demonstrates a trend towards limited protection and 
increased latitude both for law enforcement and for intelligence 
agencies.  Warshak and Davis are rare exceptions that grant a 
reasonable expectation of privacy over stored e-mails and cell site 
location data, respectively.  Quon is cited not for the presumption of 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages, but instead for 
                                               
297 United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F.Supp.2d 299, 300 (D. Conn. 2008). 
298 Id. at 301–02. 
299 Id. at 304. 
300 Id. at 313. 
301 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court E. D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
302 Trevor W. Morrison, The Story of United States v. United States District Court 
(Keith):  The Surveillance Power, 189 COLUMBIA L. S. PUB. L. & LEG. THEORY WORKING 
GROUP 8, 8 (2008). 
303 Id.  
304 United States. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 321–22. 
305 Id. at 316–17. 
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dicta that cautions against the judiciary elaborating on Fourth 
Amendment protections regarding emerging technology. 
This part has described the current state of U.S. law as it relates 
to Internet surveillance.  A general observation from all of this is the 
extreme fragmentation of U.S. law in this area.  When comparing 
these laws with the international obligations discussed in Part 2 
above, it is not entirely clear that the relaxation of surveillance 
standards in these various laws are proportional to the threats to 
national security.  At some point, targets should be able to demand 
their due process rights before a judicial body, and the Kafka-esque 
world that results from a lack of such due process procedures makes 
it hard to assess proportionality, let alone agree that these measures 
are proportional.  Of course, knowledge of the exact threats is 
needed in order to determine proportionality, and it is difficult to 
get this information without the assistance of intelligence agencies, 
who likely are unwilling to share such details.  Likewise, it is 
difficult to assess whether these measures are necessary to meet the 
demands of reality, although it is difficult to envision any scenario 
that makes it acceptable to deny individuals their due process rights 
with regard to Internet surveillance.  Therefore, it is not entirely 
clear whether the U.S. laws mentioned in this part violate the 
international obligations mentioned in the previous part.  Assessing 
the quality of the laws associated with Internet surveillance becomes 
somewhat easier when comparing the laws of two jurisdictions, as 
opposed to the international standards found in international 
human rights law.  The next part provides an analysis of the PRC’s 
law on Internet surveillance.   
 
4. PRC LAW ON INTERNET SURVEILLANCE 
 
The right to privacy, which commentators call a basic human 
right that “transcends geographical, cultural and racial 
boundaries,”306 also has been important in China all the way back to 
                                               
306 Alexandra Rengel, Privacy-Invading Technologies and Recommendations for 
Designing a Better Future for Privacy Rights, 8 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 177, 
177 (2013).  See also Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968) (examining 
the foundations of the right to privacy and how invasions of privacy make men 
feel).  See generally JAMES MICHAEL, PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE STUDY, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 1–2 (1994).  
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ancient times.307  Turning to today, Article 35 of the Constitution of 
the People’s Republic of China protects citizens’ freedom of speech, 
among other rights.308  Nevertheless, the People’s Republic of China 
has “one of the most pervasive and sophisticated regimes of Internet 
filtering and information control” in the world,309 which involves 
the monitoring and the recording of the movements of an individual 
or group of individuals by new Internet technology.310  Although the 
Internet started out as being seen as a public forum that could not 
be controlled,311 and even was characterized as “God’s gift to 
China,”312 that perception has changed to being just another one of 
the “government's tool[s] to tamp down political threats.”313  
Indeed, commentators portray China’s policies as running 
roughshod over the people’s right to privacy.314  Internet use in 
                                               
307 See Jingchun Cao, Protecting the Right to Privacy in China, 36 VICTORIA U. 
WELLINGTON L. REV. 645, 646–47 (2005) (asserting that privacy was protected, to 
some extent, in ancient China and an awareness of privacy may be found all the 
way back to the Warring States Period).  See generally Yao-Huai Lu. Privacy and Data 
Privacy Issues in Contemporary China, 7 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 7 (2005) (arguing that 
privacy protections will continue to expand in modern China and that these emerg-
ing conceptions of privacy will remain distinctively Chinese with traditional Chi-
nese values and approaches). 
308 See CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA Mar. 14, 2004, art. 35 
(protecting citizens’ “freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of 
procession and of demonstration”). 
309 Country Profiles – China, OPENNET INITIATIVE. (Aug. 9, 2012), open-
net.net/research/profiles/china-including-hong-kong.  See also Lijun Tang & Pei-
dong Yang, Symbolic Power and the Internet: The Power of a “Horse,” 33 MEDIA, 
CULTURE & SOC’Y 675, 678–79 (2011) (commenting on the control and freedom of 
internet use in China).  See generally Surya Deva, Corporate Complicity in Internet Cen-
sorship in China: Who Cares for the Global Compact of the Global Online Freedom Act?, 
39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 255, 262 (2007).  
310 See Pursuant to section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000 
COVERT SURVEILLANCE AND PROPERTY INTERFERENCE: REVISED CODE OF PRACTICE 7 
(2010) (discussing the basis of lawful surveillance activity). 
311 See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 75–77 (2007).  
312 Andrew Jacobs & Jonathan Ansfield, Nobel Peace Prize Given to Jailed Chinese 
Dissident, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2010, at A1, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/10/ 
09/world/09nobel.html?pagewanted=all. 
313 Lee & Liu, supra note 4, at 126 (“In an environment where information flows 
pervasively, the most effective and efficient tool for government control is probably 
neither strict law nor military force, but technology itself.”).  See also Kristen Farrell, 
The Big Mamas are Watching: China's Censorship of the Internet and the Strain on Free-
dom of Expression, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 577, 590 (2007) (arguing that the Internet 
has increasingly become “a tool for security agencies to identify, monitor, arrest 
and imprison potential dissidents.”). 
314 See YUEZHI ZHAO, COMMUNICATION IN CHINA: POLITICAL ECONOMY, POWER, 
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China has grown at a seemingly exponential rate.315  However, there 
are only a few legal limitations on the authorities when it comes to 
Internet surveillance, with the vast majority of laws providing the 
authorities many express powers over content censorship.316  This 
part analyzes PRC legislation, regulations adopted by the State 
Council, and ministerial measures adopted in relation to Internet 
surveillance, with particular attention being paid to any procedural 
and substantive limitations on the government’s Internet 
surveillance powers that these instruments might provide, 
especially within the context of matters relating to national security 
and public interests.  Before proceeding with that analysis, however, 
it is important to note how surprising it is that there are no relevant 
cases in the PRC concerning electronic surveillance and censorship.  
There are a few potential reasons for this.  First, it may be that there 
are a few cases, but they have not been reported or publicized as 
they relate to state secrets or classified information, which is quite 
common for PRC cases.317  Second, PRC courts will not officially 
                                               
AND CONFLICT 31–32 (2008) (analyzing the transformation of China’s communica-
tion system).  
315 See THE INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL PRC, PROGRESS IN 
CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS IN 2013, May 2014, available at www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/ 
wz/Document/1371125/1371125.htm. 
(“[T]he number of citizens in China had reached 618 million and the Inter-
net coverage rate 45.8 percent; domain names totaled 18.44 million, web-
sites 3.2 million and webpages 150 billion; Internet forum/bulletin board 
system (BBS) users numbered 120 million, blog and personal webpage us-
ers 437 million, social networking website users 278 million, network lit-
erature users 274 million, network video users 428 million, microblog us-
ers 281 million and instant messaging (IM) users 532 million; cellphone IM 
users numbered 431 million and cellphone microblog users 196 million; 
and 5,820 websites in China providing Internet education information ser-
vices, 703 providing Internet news information services, 783 providing In-
ternet cultural products, 282 providing Internet audio-visual programs, 
292 providing Internet publishing services and 2,010 providing Internet 
BBS services.”).  
316 See RONALD DEIBERT, ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS 
AND RULE IN CYBERSPACE 456–60 (2010) (noting that more than sixty government 
regulations, enforced at both the national and local levels, regulate online content).  
See also Trina K. Kissel, License to Blog: Internet Regulation in the People's Republic of 
China, 17 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 229, 233–34 (2007) (recognizing how the Chinese 
Communist Party has regulated the internet extensively). 
317 For cases not tried in open court sessions because of their involvement of 
state secrets, see CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 
183 (1996) (“A people’s court shall try cases of first instance in open court sessions, 
except for the cases involving state secrets or personal privacy.”).  See also CIVIL 
PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 134 (1991) (stating that 
cases that involve state secrets shall not be heard publicly by people’s courts).  See 
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accept and register those cases so that the potential risks and 
responsibilities associated with taking on such cases will be 
minimized.318  Finally, where such issues arise, administrative 
agencies might prefer handling the matter through administrative 
measures, as opposed to the courts.319  With that in mind, this part 
proceeds to analyze the PRC law on electronic surveillance.  
 
4.1. Summary of PRC Legislation 
 
From the outset, it is important to understand that the 
Communist Part of China (“CPC”) has adopted no special law that 
restricts the government’s power to conduct Internet surveillance 
per se.  There are several models for protecting privacy generally in 
the literature, including a comprehensive law, specific sectorial 
laws, and laws that promote self-regulation.320  In many states, these 
models are used together to ensure privacy protection, especially 
from the potential abuse from the exemptions for law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies.  The comprehensive law model is favored 
by Europe, with E.U. laws that govern the collection, use, and 
dissemination of personal information by both public and private 
                                               
generally ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 
65 (1989). 
318 See Kevin J. O'Brien & Lianjiang Li, Suing the Local State: Administrative Liti-
gation in Rural China, THE CHINA JOURNAL, Jan. 2004, at 75, 80–83 (“According to a 
Chinese researcher: ‘courts can only manoeuvre around a handful of so-called “con-
crete administrative acts”, and dare not undertake big moves on the numerous gen-
eral actions based on 'policies' (zhengce).  Taking into account the large number of 
illegal actions, lawsuits filed and accepted amount to one cup of water when a 
whole cart of hay is on fire.”); Xin He, Why Did They not Take on the Disputes? Law, 
Power and Politics in the Decision-Making of Chinese Courts, 3 INT’L J. L. IN CONTEXT 
203, 221–22 (2007) (recognizing how courts are not directly taking on certain dis-
putes). 
319 See O'Brien & Li, supra note 318, at 80-83 (“Sometimes, acceptance of a suit 
induces the defendants to pursue a settlement out of court.”); Veron Mei-Ying 
Hung, Administrative Litigation and Court Reform in the People's Republic of 
China, (November, 2002) (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford Law School) at 260–65 (dis-
cussing how cases are resolved through disguised forms of mediation (e.g., xietiao)); 
Robyn Marshall, Administrative Law in the People's Republic of China: A Process 
of Justice (2003) (Ph.D. dissertation, Australian National University) at 211 (prefer-
ring the term "pre-end-of-trial settlement" because judges are often intimately in-
volved in the process). 
320 See ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER AND PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL 
(ORGANIZATION), PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1999: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF 
PRIVACY LAWS AND DEVELOPMENTS 12–14 (1999) (recognizing and analyzing the ma-
jor models for privacy protections). 
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entities.321  There is no general data protection law in the PRC, and 
there are only a few laws that limit government interference with 
privacy.  This should not come as a surprise, as it seems like 
common knowledge that the PRC has a long-standing policy of 
keeping close track of its citizens.322  Even though the PRC 
Constitution states that the law shall protect citizens’ privacy with 
regard to correspondence,323 no special law or enforceable legal 
rules implementing this constitutional right exist.  Moreover, those 
provisions that relate to the protection of personal information in the 
context of criminal law, tort law, and elsewhere lack detail and are 
of questionable enforceability.324  More important for this article, 
these laws do not expressly (or even implicitly) restrict the 
government’s powers with Internet surveillance, let alone when 
national security and public interests are involved.  The Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences created the draft bill Personal 
Information Protection Law to the State Council for consideration in 
2008, although there has been no further action taken on this draft 
bill, allegedly due to conflicting opinions of different ministries and 
administrative authorities.325  Moreover, there are some pieces of 
legislation that restrict the government’s Internet surveillance 
powers in name only, such as the Telecommunications Regulations 
of the People's Republic of China (2000) and the Information 
Security Technology—Guidelines on Personal Information 
Protection of Public and Commercial Service Information Systems 
(2012), as explained in the following sections of this part of the 
                                               
321 See, e.g., Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 24 Oct. 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, No. L. 281/31-50, 
23/11/1995 (protecting the rights and freedoms of natural persons, and particularly 
“their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.”). 
322 See ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 320, at 58 (discuss-
ing the level of protection to unauthorized access of private information). 
323 CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, arts. 38 and 40. 
324 See, e.g., GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA, art. 120 (1986) (“Where the right of a citizen to his name, likeness, reputa-
tion, or honor is infringed, he has a right to demand that the infringement cease, 
the reputation be restored, and the effects [of the infringement] be eliminated, and 
to demand an apology; he may also demand compensation for loss.”); CRIMINAL 
LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 253 (1979, revised 1997) (“Postal work-
ers who open, hide, or destroy mail or telegrams without authorization are to be 
sentenced to two years or less in prison or put under criminal detention.”). 
325 See Li Li & Wenmiao Xu. Why the Personal Information Protection Legislation 
is “Shut Down”?, CHINA YOUTH DAILY, May 23, 2012, at 3, available at zqb.cyol.com/ 
html/2012-05/23/nw.D110000zgqnb_20120523_2-03.htm (reporting on the Chi-
nese legislative process regardng personal information protection). 
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article.  However, no comprehensive law or abstract or specific legal 
principles in legislation are seen as actually restricting the 
government’s Internet surveillance powers.  In addition, no judicial 
review or remedial mechanism exists to address state Internet 
surveillance.  Indeed, cases involving these kinds of issues likely will 
not even be heard by the judiciary, given the political sensitivity 
involved, and so it is difficult to anticipate the types of remedies that 
might conceivably be available if the situation were different.326  To 
be clear, the PRC appears to be expanding its efforts to censor and 
control the Internet through surveillance, both with regard to new 
technology and to new online mediums of expression.327  In essence, 
the PRC can be seen as using technological innovation to detect 
malfeasance,328 as well as to control information.  As one 
commentator has stated, “Code is the law,”329 with the PRC 
controlling the Internet through code.330  While this might be 
troubling from a privacy perspective, the People’s Republic of China 
appears to have never given anyone a basis to believe that they have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy within the People’s Republic of 
China.  Therefore, the relative predictability of the PRC’s approach 
makes it somewhat favorable to the U.S. approach, where U.S. 
citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy on account of the 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but that protection has 
been severely undermined mainly in the name of U.S. anti-terrorism 
efforts.  The remainder of this part analyzes the relevant PRC laws, 
regulations and guidelines that relate to Internet surveillance, with 
an eye to trying to find actual limitations on PRC Internet 
surveillance.  
                                               
326 See R. P. PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 280–82, 
298–316  (2002) (discussing judicial independence in China). 
327 See Provisional Regulations for the Administration of Online Culture, May 
10, 2003, Article 3(2) (regulating “the distribution of cultural products, not just over 
the Internet, but also to such ‘user terminals’ as ‘fixed-line telephones, mobile tele-
phones, radios, television sets, and games machines for browsing, reading, appre-
ciation, use or downloading by internet users . . . .’”).  
328 See generally Jonathan Sullivan, China’s Weibo: Is Faster Different?, 16 NEW 
MEDIA & SOC’Y 24 (2014).  
329 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 5, 24 (2006 2ND 
eds.).  
330 See Lee & Liu, supra note 4, at 129 (“What we attempt to illustrate is how a 
government can shape human behavior via architecture design and the inimitable 
role played by code-based regulations in law enforcement.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
 
482 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:2 
4.2. Law Enacted by the National People's Congress 
 
4.2.1. Law of the People's Republic of China on Guarding State 
Secrets (2010) 
 
On April 29, 2010, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Guarding State Secrets was adopted at the 14th Session of the 11th 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the 
People's Republic of China, which law came into effect on October 
1, 2010.331  Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of that law provides, “State 
secrets shall be prohibited from being transmitted on the Internet or 
any other public information network or via wire or wireless 
communications without any security measures.”332  Article 27 
further provides that “the editing, publication, printing and 
distribution of newspapers, books, audio and video products and 
electronic publications, the production and broadcasting of 
broadcasts, television programs and films, the information 
compilation and release on the Internet, mobile communications 
networks and other public information networks and via other 
media must comply with the secret-guiding provisions.”333  In 
accordance with Article 28, Internet operators, network operators 
and service providers are obliged to: (1) cooperate with government 
authorities when carrying out investigation; (2) stop the 
transmission of problematic cases, keeping the records and making 
a report of such cases; and (3) delete information when required in 
order to guard state secrets.334 
An important question that arises from these provisions is what 
is the precise definition and scope of “state secret.”  Article 2 defines 
“state secret” as “matters that have a vital bearing on state security 
and national interests and, as determined according to statutory 
procedures, are known by people within a certain scope for a given 
                                               
331 See U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, 2010 REPORT 
TO CONGRESS OF THE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, at 258 
(2010) (discussing the revisions of China’s State Secret Laws). 
332 Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets, Order No. 28 of the President of the 
People's Republic of China, Apr. 29, 2010, at art. 26 (entered into force Oct. 1, 2010) 
(translation from Westlaw China).  
333 Id. at art. 27 
334 Id. at art. 28. 
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period of time.”335  Article 9 specifically contains six categories of 
secrets and two other ambiguous kinds of information (other 
matters and secrets of political parties) all falling under the scope of 
state secrets:  
The following matters involving State security and national 
interests shall be determined as State secrets if the 
divulgence of such matters is likely to prejudice State 
security and national interests in the fields such as political 
affairs, economy, national defense and foreign affairs: 
(1) secrets concerning major policy decisions on State affairs; 
(2) secrets in the building of national defense and in the 
activities of the armed forces; 
(3) secrets in diplomatic activities and in the activities related 
to foreign affairs as well as secrets to be kept as commitments 
to foreign countries; 
(4) secrets in the national economic and social development; 
(5) secrets concerning science and technology; 
(6) secrets concerning the activities for safeguarding State 
security and the investigation of criminal offences; and 
(7) other matters that are classified as State secrets by the 
State secret-guarding department. 
Secrets of political parties that conform to the provisions of 
the preceding paragraph shall be State secrets.336 
                                               
335 Id., at art. 9.  See also Phillip Barber, Bull in the China Market: The Gap between 
Investor Expectations and Auditor Liability for Chinese Financial Statement Frauds, 24 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 349, 355 (2013) (“China’s ‘state secrets’ laws may cover 
audit work papers and may require pre-approval from Chinese regulatory author-
ities before any disclosure to foreign regulators.”); Qingxiu Bu, The Chinese Reverse 
Merger Companies (RMCs) Reassessed: Promising but Challenging?, 12 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 
17, 27 (2013) (“Another most controversial issue is whether a PCAOB-registered but 
China-based audit firm is obliged to file an SEC report. The defendant argued that 
Chinese State Secrets Law criminalizes the disclosure of information that relates to 
Chinese national security and other potentially sensitive interests.”).  But see SEC v. 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA, 928 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D. Del 2013) (declaration of 
Donald Clarke indicating that, for off-site inspections, Chinese law does not require 
pre-approval and that an auditor could make a judgment for itself that its work 
papers contain no state secrets).  
336 Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, supra note 332, at 
art. 9. 
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Article 28 of this law also provides the obligations on Internet 
operators and other public information network operators and 
service providers:  
Internet operators and other public information network 
operators and service providers shall provide cooperation in 
the investigation over cases involving the divulgence of State 
secrets conducted by the public security organs, State 
security organs and procuratorial organs; when discovering 
that the information released on the Internet or any other 
public information network involves divulgence of State 
secrets, the operators and providers shall immediately stop 
the transmission thereof, keep the relevant records, and 
make a report to the public security organs, the State security 
organs or the secret-guarding administrative departments; 
the information involving the divulgence of State secrets 
shall be deleted as required by the public security organs, the 
State security organs or the secret-guarding administrative 
departments.337 
Therefore, as long as related security organs and administrative 
departments claim that the online information fits within one of 
these categories of “state secrets,” then those Internet operators, 
network operators and service providers have the obligation to 
delete the content, with political pressure and economic threats 
further ensuring compliance.338  As can be seen from a few incidents 
in Shanghai, the government authorities seem to have complete 
discretion in classifying actions into these categories, with no 
possibility of meaningful judicial review being observed.339  Such a 
                                               
337 Id. at art. 28. 
338 Id. at arts. 48–49.  See also State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 
Implementing Regulations of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Guard-
ing State Secrets, art. 40  
(“Where, during confidentiality inspection or the investigation of a case of 
divulgement of State secrets, the relevant organ or entity and its staff 
members refuse to provide cooperation, practice fraud, conceal or destroy 
evidence, or otherwise avoid or obstruct such inspection or investigation, 
the person directly in charge and other personnel subject to direct liabili-
ties shall be given disciplinary sanctions pursuant to the law.  Any enter-
prise or public institution and its staff members that assist an organ or en-
tity to avoid or obstruct confidentiality inspection or the investigation of a 
case of divulgement of State secrets shall be punished by relevant compe-
tent departments pursuant to the law.”). 
339 See Yu v. Shanghai Municipal People's Government, Shanghai Second In-
termediate Court, Initial Administrative Ruling, Docket No. 52, Jan. 14, 2011 
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broad classification of state secrets allows the government agencies 
to have stronger decision-making powers when it comes to Internet 
censorship.340  In the place of clear standards has arisen a host of 
“sensitive words” (or Min Gan Ci), which are not to be used in online 
searches in the PRC.341  
Clearly, there is considerable interference in people’s freedom of 
expression from this method of controlling large ISPs and other 
kinds of data owners.342 In order to perform their duties of 
reporting, deleting and providing information to security 
authorities, large-scale and instant information censorship and 
Internet surveillance are required of ISPs and other Internet 
operators, under the general guidance and direct requirements of 
national security public authorities.343  The end of this section 
compares these actions with U.S. Internet surveillance and 
international norms.  However, before providing that analysis, a few 
other PRC laws must be analyzed.  
 
                                               
(“monthly income data about the proceeds from the car license plate (private car 
quota) auction” and “certificate and related records of ownership of real estate” are 
classified as “state secrets,” and the court did not try to challenge or review the 
executive branch’s discretion). 
340 See Michael Ting, The Role of the WTO in Limiting China's Censorship Policies, 
41 HONG KONG L.J. 285, 288 (2011) (discussing censorship in China).  See also Anne 
S.Y. Cheung, The Business of Governance: China's Legislation on Content Regulation in 
Cyberspace, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 1, 15 (2005) (“The scope of the Encryption 
Regulations is so broad and the requirements so stringent that they even cover Lotus 
and Microsoft office suites.”). 
341 Rebecca MacKinnon, China’s Censorship 2.0: How Companies Censor Bloggers, 
FIRST MONDAY, Feb. 2009, available at http://firstmonday.org/article/view/2378/ 
2089.  See also THOMAS LUM, INTERNET DEVELOPMENT AND INFORMATION CONTROL IN 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 4 (2006) (analyzing methods of PRC Internet cen-
sorship and content control).  
342 See Christopher Stevenson, Breaching the Great Firewall: China's Internet Cen-
sorship and the Quest for Freedom of Expression in a Connected World, 30 BC INT'L & 
COMP. L. REV. 531, 538 (2007) (discussing Chinese internet regulations on providers 
of Internet services).  See also Trina K. Kissel, License to Blog: Internet Regulation in the 
People's Republic of China, 17 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 229, 236 (2007) (discussing 
regulations developed by CPP that hold “many entities and individuals accounta-
ble for accessible content on the Internet”).  
343 See Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, supra note 332, 
art. 28; Cheung, supra note 340, at 37 (“The waves of legislation that have been 
passed in China to monitor the Internet have caused a ripple effect in legal, Internet, 
and business culture, and concrete legal regulations on the suppression of speech 
are going hand in hand with an emerging set of social business norms.”) 
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4.2.2. Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress  
 
The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress on Strengthening Network Information Protection was 
adopted and came into effect at the 30th Session of the Standing 
Committee of the 11th National People's Congress on December 28, 
2012.344  The decision itself is quite broad and better represents a set 
of principles than a clear law, with many of the provisions lacking 
the specificity required for accurate understanding and 
compliance.345  In essence, the decision sets out some rules for 
Internet service providers and other entities to follow in relation to 
electronic personal information.  In particular, the decision provides 
that electronic personal data and electronic privacy shall be 
protected, and organizations as well as individuals are prohibited 
from stealing or otherwise unlawfully obtaining personal electronic 
information.346  Network service providers shall take technical 
measures and other necessary measures, particularly including 
remedial measures, to ensure information security.347  A noticeable 
gap in the decision is a restriction on governmental powers 
concerning Internet surveillance in the name of national security 
and public interests.  
It is interesting to note that this decision was adopted with the 
goal of “safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of citizens, 
legal persons and other organizations, as well as national security 
                                               
344 See Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Decision of the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Strengthening Network 
Information Protection, Adopted at the 30th Session of the Standing Committee of 
the 11th National People's Congress on Dec. 28, 2012. 
345 For example, there is no guidance regarding which governmental depart-
ment or agency will supervise or enforce the rules.  See Erica Gann Kitaev, China 
Adopts Privacy Legislation Strengthening Online Personal Data Protection, DATA 
PRIVACY MONITOR, Jan. 8, 2013, (“The decision reflects China’s recent push to ad-
dress the issue of online personal data protection . . . .”).  
346 See NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS STANDING COMMITTEE, DECISION OF THE 
STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS ON STRENGTHENING 
NETWORK INFORMATION PROTECTION ¶ 1 (“The State shall protect electronic infor-
mation that is able to identify the identity of individual citizens and electronic in-
formation concerning the personal privacy of citizens. Organizations and individ-
uals shall neither steal or otherwise unlawfully obtain the personal electronic 
information of citizens, nor sell or illegally provide others with such electronic in-
formation.”).  
347 Id. at ¶ 4. 
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and public interest.”348  This language notwithstanding, the decision 
focuses on what network service providers should do to fulfill their 
obligations, with no portion providing a restriction on 
governmental agencies’ powers in investigation, censorship, 
wiretapping and spying in the name of national security and public 
interests.349  Without adequate oversight and independent 
supervision, the mere presence of an exception for national security 
and public interests would appear to have a significant chilling 
effect on expression.350  
 
4.3. Regulations Enacted by the State Council 
 
4.3.1. Administrative Measures on Internet Information Services 
(2000) 
 
“Administrative Measures on Internet Information Services” 
was adopted by the PRC State Council on September 25, 2000,351 and 
deals with how the government can control the operation of profit-
making Internet information services, from the initial executive 
permission to legal obligations and to punishments.352  These 
measures include a permit system for profit-making Internet 
information services and the record-filing system of non-profit-
making Internet information services,353 which enables the 
government to tightly control the ISPs and other Internet 
                                               
348 Id. at preface.  
349 Id. at ¶¶ 2–6. 
350 See ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 320, at 14–15 (an-
alyzing the models of privacy protection); Neil Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance. 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013) (asserting this constitutes a major erosion of 
personal privacy). 
351 Hulian Wang, Xinxi Fuwu & Guanli Banfa (互联网信息服务管理办法) [Ad-
ministrative Measures on Internet Information Services] (promulgated by the St. 
Council, Sep. 25, 2000, effective Jan. 8, 2001), http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/con-
tent/2011/content_1860864.htm. 
352 See, e.g., id., arts. 19–25 (providing legal penalties and other punishments 
for violations). 
353 See Wang et al., supra note 351, art. 4 (2000) (“The State applies the permit 
system to profit-making Internet information services and applies the record-filing 
system to non-profit-making Internet information services. Anyone who does not 
obtain a license or does not go through the record-filing formalities shall not engage 
in Internet information services.”). 
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operators.354  These measures also include more strict supervision of 
“electronic bulletin board services,” referring to “item-specific 
application” and “item-specific record-filing.”355  In particular, 
Article 14 of these measures states:  
An Internet information service provider engaged in news, 
publication, or electronic bulletin board services shall keep 
records of the information provided, time of publishing, and 
the Internet address or domain name.  An Internet 
connection service provider shall keep records of the online 
users' connection time, accounts, Internet address or domain 
name, and the calling party's telephone number. 
The backup records of the Internet information service 
provider and the Internet access service provider shall be 
kept for 60 days, and shall be provided to the relevant 
authorities for inquiry purposes if so required.356 
Article 16 of these measures also creates for Internet information 
providers the obligation to “promptly terminate the distribution 
and keep relevant records and report to the relevant authorities,”357 
which is similar to other provisions in laws and regulations already 
mentioned above.  Controlling the flow of information on the 
Internet always has been an indispensable part of the PRC 
government’s efforts to maintaining social stability and national 
security.358 
                                               
354 See id. at art. 5 (“Any engagement in Internet information services related 
to news, publication, education, medical and health care, pharmaceuticals and 
medical equipment etc., prior to applying for an operation permit or going through 
the record-filing formalities, shall be subject to the examination and consent of the 
relevant competent authorities.”).  
355 See id. at art. 9. (“When applying for an operation permit for its profit-mak-
ing Internet information services or filing for record of its non-profit-making Inter-
net information service, an Internet service provider who intends to provide elec-
tronic bulletin board services shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of 
the State, submit an item-specific application or apply for item-specific record-fil-
ing.”). 
356 Id. at art. 14. 
357 Id. at art. 16 (“Where an Internet information provider discovers the infor-
mation distributed on its website apparently falls within the scope as provided in 
Article 15 of these Measures, it shall promptly terminate the distribution and keep 
relevant records and report to the relevant authorities.”). 
358 See Wei Shen, Will the Door Open Wider in the Aftermath of Alibaba-Placing (or 
Misplacing) Foreign Investment in a Chinese Public Law Frame, 42 HONG KONG L.J. 561, 
585 (2012) (examining China's regulatory measures in tackling the "variable interest 
entity" structure widely adopted by foreign entities seeking to access China's tele-
communications market, and offering a political economy analysis to potentially 
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4.3.2. Telecommunications Regulations of the People's Republic of 
China (2000) 
 
The PRC State Council also created the Telecommunications 
Regulations in 2000, which apply to basic telecom services and 
value-added telecom services, including most aspects of Internet 
service.359  Article 66(1) of those regulations would appear to refer to 
some restrictions on government authorities in using telecom 
communications:   
Telecom users' freedom to legally use telecom and the 
confidentiality of their communications are protected by 
law.  No organization or individual may inspect the content 
of telecom for any reason, except that public security 
authorities, the State security authority, and the People's 
Procuratorate may do so in accordance with the procedures 
stipulated by law in response to the requirements of State 
security or the investigation of criminal offences.360 
An exhaustive search for such “procedures stipulated by law” has 
uncovered no such procedures.  Without such procedures, this 
supposed limitation on government authority under Article 66(1) 
turns out to be entirely empty.  
                                               
rationalize these regulatory movements.).  See also Cheung, supra note 340, at 19  
(“The general rule is that all IISPs are required to provide online users with quality 
services and to ensure the ‘legality’ of the information that is provided under article 
13.  Under article 14, IISPs that offer news coverage and bulletin board services are 
required to keep a sixty-day record of the information that they distribute, when it 
is distributed, and the Web address where the information is located.  IISPs are 
similarly required to keep records of the time of use, accounts of Internet addresses 
or domain names, and dial-in telephone numbers of online users for 60 days.  The 
Regulations are considered to be the prime model for the strict control of Internet 
administration.”). 
359 See Dianxin Tiaoli (电信条例) [Telecommunications Regulation] (promul-
gated by the St. Council, Sep. 25, 2000, revised July 29, 2014, effective July 29, 2014), 
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11294912/n11296257/16519133.html, art. 
2(2) (2000) (“For the purposes of these Regulations, telecom shall mean the activities 
of delivery, transmission, or reception of voice, text, data, image, and other forms 
of information through utilizing wire or wireless electromagnetic system or photo-
electric system.”). 
360 Jisuanji Xinxi, Wangluo Guoji, Lianwang Guanli & Zanxing Guiding (计算
机信息网络国际联网管理暂行规定) [Interim Provisions Governing International In-
terconnection of Computer-based Information Networks] (promulgated by the St. 
Council, Feb. 1, 2006, revised May 20, 1997, effective May 20, 1997), 
http://govinfo.nlc.gov.cn/fjsfz/zfgb/19978160/201104/t20110413_680140.shtml?
classid=388. 
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Other regulations from the State Council would appear to be 
relevant to this study, based on their name.  For example, there is 
the 1997 “Interim Provisions of the People's Republic of China 
Governing International Interconnection of Computer-based 
Information Networks.”361  However, these interim provisions do 
not refer to precise procedures or criteria for Internet surveillance 
and state governance, and so have not been featured in this article. 
 
4.4. Departmental Measures 
 
4.4.1. Administrative Measures for Protection of the Security of 
International Inter-Networking of Computer Information 
Networks (1997) 
 
The Administrative Measures for Protection of the Security of 
International Inter-Networking of Computer Information Networks 
was formulated by Ministry of Public Security and came into force 
on December 30, 1997.362  These administrative measures related to 
protection of computer-based information networks within the 
PRC.363  In particular, these measures state that no unit or individual 
may access computer-based networks or use computer-based 
network resources without authorization, which authorization can 
be granted by the Ministry of Public Security.364  Moreover, Article 
5 ambiguously provides that it is prohibited to produce, reproduce, 
search for or disseminate nine categories of information, including 
“information that fabricates or distorts facts, spreads rumours and 
disrupts the social order” and “information that damages the 
reputation and credibility of State organs.”365  The following is 
Article 5 in full: 
                                               
361 Jisuanji Xinxi et al. (计算机信息网络国际联网安全保护管理办法) [Adminis-
trative Measures for Protection of the Security of International Internetworking of 
Computer Information Networks] (promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 11, 1997, 
effective Dec. 30, 1997), 
http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n1282/n3493/n3823/n442104/452202.html. 
362 Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China, Administra-
tive Measures for Protection of the Security of International Internetworking of 
Computer Information Networks, Order No. 33, Dec. 16, 1997. 
363 Id. at art. 2. 
364 Id. at arts. 3, 6. 
365 Id. at art. 5. 
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No unit or individual may utilize international 
interconnection to produce, reproduce, search for or 
disseminate the following information: 
(1) information that incites resistance to and disruption of the 
implementation of the Constitution, laws and administrative 
regulations; 
(2) information that incites the subversion of the State 
political power and the overthrow of the socialist system; 
(3) information that incites the splitting up of the country 
and the sabotage of national unity; 
(4) information that incites hatred and discrimination among 
ethnic groups and sabotages solidarity among ethnic groups; 
(5) information that fabricates or distorts facts, spreads 
rumours and disrupts the social order; 
(6) information that propagates feudalistic superstitions, 
obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, murder and 
terror and instigates crimes; 
(7) information that openly insults others or fabricates facts 
to slander others; 
(8) information that damages the reputation and credibility 
of State organs; and 
(9) other information that violates the Constitution, laws and 
administrative regulations.366 
These measures are not very clear, and neither are the results, if any. 
Moreover, under Article 8 and 10 of these measures, units and 
individuals engaged in international interconnection businesses are 
required to “accept security supervision, inspection and guidance of 
public security organs, truthfully provide information, materials 
and data” concerning security of “public security organs, and assist 
public security organs in investigating and handling illegal and 
criminal acts” through computer-based information networks.367  
                                               
366 Id. at art. 5. 
367 Hulian Wang, Wangluo Anquan, Xinxi Tongbao & Shishi Banfa (互联网网
络安全信息通报实施办法) [Ministry of Industry and Information for the Implemen-
tation of the Internet Security Information Report] (promulgated by the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology, Apr. 13, 2009, effective June 1, 2009), 
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293832/n11294057/n11302390/12336245
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Internet operators also must keep records, requiring users to “fill in 
the user record form,” and requiring computer administration and 
supervision agencies of public security organs to stay informed of 
the records and information of the interconnecting units, keeping 
files and statistics, and reporting them to the authorities in 
accordance with the relevant State provisions.368 
 
4.4.2. Measures for the Implementation of the Internet Security 
Information Report (2009) 
 
This security information reporting regulation was adopted by 
the Ministry of Industry and Information, which came into effect on 
June 1, 2009.369  The information that is required under these 
measures is divided into event information (the information on the 
network security events that already have occurred) and pre-
warning information (the information that poses a potential threat 
or danger although no actual damage or impact has yet occurred, or 
predictive information concluded after analysis into certain event 
information).370 
The content of event information to be provided to the 
authorities includes the details of the event, any damages caused 
and the extent of the impact.371  The content of pre-warning 
information that must be provided to the authorities includes the 
systems affected, the possible damage and degree of the damage if 
the event occurs, the users that are likely to be affected, and the 
recommended measures to be taken to avoid the actual event from 
taking place.372  Based on the provision in Annex 1, state Internet 
surveillance can be conducted with the collaboration of many 
agencies (“information submission organizations”), including 
communications administrative bureaus, basic telecom service 
operators, value-added telecom service operators that operate 
services in more than one province, the National Computer 
                                               
.html. 
368 Id. at arts. 11, 12, 16. 
369 Ministry of Industry and Information of the People’s Republic of China, 
Measures for the Implementation of the Internet Security Information Report. Gong 
Xin Bu Bao [2009] No. 156, Apr. 13, 2009 (entered into force June 1, 2009).  
370 Id.at art. 10. 
371 Id.at art. 14. 
372 Id.at art. 15. 
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Network Emergency Response Technical Team/Coordination 
Center of China (“CNCERT”), Internet domain name registration 
administrative agency, Internet domain name registration service 
agency, and the China Internet Association.373  In sum, the CNCERT, 
entrusted with power by the Bureau of Communications Security 
under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, is the 
principal organization responsible for the information reporting 
work, even though other information submission organizations 
provide their respective information reports to the Bureau of 
Communications Security for filing.374  Overlapping multi-level 
administration is a long-term threat to further improvement of 
Internet security information reporting. 
 
4.4.3. Administrative Measures for the Security Protection of 
Communication Networks (2010) 
 
The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology adopted 
the Administrative Measures for the Security Protection of 
Communication Networks on March 1, 2010.375  These measures are 
to apply to the network security protection work with respect of 
public communication networks and the Internet (“Communication 
Networks”) managed and operated by telecommunication 
operators and Internet domain name service providers (“Entities 
Operating Communication Networks”) within China, with this 
security protection work adhering to the principles of active 
defense, comprehensive prevention, and hierarchical protection.376 
                                               
373 Tongxin Wangluo, Anquan Fanghu & Guanli Banfa (通信网络安全防护管
理办法) [Administrative Measures for the Security Protection of Communication 
Networks] (promulgated by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 
Jan. 21, Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293832/ 
n11294042/n11302345/13009694.html. 
374 Id.at arts. 3–5, 7, 8. 
375 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic 
of China, Administrative Measures for the Security Protection of Communication 
Networks, Decree No. 11, Jan. 21, 2010 (entered into force Mar. 1, 2010). 
376 Dianxin He, Huluan Wang, Yonghu Geren & Xinxi Baohu Guiding (电信和
互联网用户个人信息保护规定) [Provisions on Protecting the Personal Information 
of Telecommunications and Internet Users] (promulgated by the Ministry of Indus-
try and Information Technology, July 16, 2013, effective Sep. 1, 2013), art. 2, 
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293832/n11293907/n11368223/15513450
.html. 
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These measures specifically point out that the staff of the 
Telecommunication Administrative Authority, which is made up of 
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and 
Communication Administrative Bureaus, must have the obligation 
to maintain the confidentiality of state secrets, trade secrets and 
personal secrets that come to their knowledge in the course of 
inspection.377  The question arises if these staff members are to 
prohibit PRC intelligence agencies from accessing this information.  
Again, no provisions restrict access to these types of agencies. 
 
4.4.4. Provisions on Protecting the Personal Information of 
Telecommunications and Internet Users (2013) 
 
The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology adopted 
Order No. 24 in 2013, which focused on “collecting and using the 
personal information of users during the provision of 
telecommunications services and Internet information services.”378  
The key provisions, Articles 5 and 9, are as follows:  
Article 5  
Telecommunications business operators and Internet 
information service providers shall, during the provision of 
services, collect and use the personal information of users in 
a lawful and proper manner and by following the principle 
of necessity. . . .379 
Article 9  
Without the consent of users, telecommunications business 
operators and Internet information service providers are not 
                                               
377 Id., at art. 21. 
378 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic 
of China, Provisions on Protecting the Personal Information of Telecommunications 
and Internet Users, Order No. 24 (2013), art. 2. 
379 (信息安全技术公共及商用服务信息系统个人信息保护指南) [Information 
Security Technology – Guidelines on Personal Information Protection of Public and 
Commercial Service Information Systems], GB/Z 28828-2012, National Standard 
Announcement No.28, (promulgated by the General Administration of Quality Su-
pervision, Inspection and Quarantine & Standardization Administration, Nov. 5, 
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allowed to collect and use the personal information of the 
users.  
Telecommunications business operators and Internet 
information service providers that collect or use the personal 
information of users shall clearly inform the users of the 
following information:  the purposes, methods and scope of 
information collection or use, the channels for the users to 
inquire about and correct information, the consequences of 
refusing to provide information, etc. 
Telecommunications business operators and Internet 
information service providers shall not collect users' 
personal information that is not necessary for their provision 
of services, shall not use users' personal information for 
purposes other than the provision of services, and shall not 
collect or use information in a deceptive, misleading or 
compulsory manner, in violation of laws or administrative 
regulations, or in breach of the agreements between relevant 
parties. 
After users have terminated the use of telecommunications 
services or Internet information service, telecommunications 
business operators and Internet information service 
providers shall stop the collection and use of the users' 
personal information, and provide the users with services for 
deregistering relevant phone numbers or account numbers. 
The provisions otherwise prescribed by laws or 
administrative regulations on the circumstances listed under 
Paragraph 1 through to Paragraph 4 of this article shall 
prevail.380 
Although Articles 5 and 9 state some basic principles for collecting 
and using personal information, yet again there are no restrictions 
on Internet surveillance when it comes to national security. 
 
4.5. Other Guidelines 
 
There are several non-binding rules and guidelines that are 
designed to regulate the use of information systems for personal 
                                               
380 Id. at art. 9. 
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information handling.  One example is entitled “Information 
Security Technology—Guidelines on Personal Information 
Protection of Public and Commercial Service Information Systems 
(GB/Z28828-2012).”381  The General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, and Standardization 
Administration of the People’s Republic of China formulated this 
national standard.382  This technical guidance is for organizations 
and institutions other than government organs and other agencies 
performing public administration duties, such as service agencies in 
the fields of telecommunications, financial and medical services.383  
The key provisions are as follows:  
Article 4.1.5.  Third-party testing and evaluation agency 
From the perspective of protecting public interests, a third-
party testing and evaluation agency shall, according to the 
authorization granted by personal information protection 
management departments and industry associations, or 
upon entrustment by administrators of personal 
information, test and evaluate information systems in 
accordance with relevant State laws, regulations and this 
guiding technical document to obtain the situations of 
personal information protection which shall be taken as the 
bases by administrators of personal information for 
assessing, supervising and guiding personal information 
protection work.384 
Article 4.2.  Fundamental principles 
When handling personal information via information 
systems, an administrator of personal information is 
recommended to abide by the following fundamental 
principles: 
a) The principle of clear purposes . . .385 
                                               
381 General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
& Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of China, Information 
Security Technology -- Guidelines on Personal Information Protection of Public and 
Commercial Service Information Systems, GB/Z 28828-2012, National Standard 
Announcement No.28, Nov. 5, 2012 (entered into force Feb. 1, 2013).  
382 Id. 
383 Id.at art. 1.  
384 Id. at art. 4.1.5. 
385 See id.at art. 4.2(a)  
(“The principle of clear purposes -- The administrator of personal information shall 
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b) The principle of minimum information necessary for the 
performance of tasks . . .386 
c) The principle of public notification . . .387 
d) The principle of personal consent . . .  
e) The principle of quality assurance . . . 
f) The principle of security guarantee . . . 
g) The principle of good faith performance . . ., and  
h) The principle of clear responsibilities . . . .388  
These guidelines divide the process of personal information 
handling within an information system into four major stages, 
collection, processing, transfer and deletion, and accordingly 
personal information protection must be carried out throughout 
these for stages.389  In addition, these guidelines establish several 
mechanisms to supervise the security of information systems for the 
sake of protecting the public interest of privacy, such as the “Third-
party testing and evaluation” rule provided in Article 4.1.5.390  
Moreover, those eight principles in Article 4.2 are similar to OECD 
Council Recommendation and EU Directive (Directive 95/46/EC), 
such as the “Data Quality Principle”391 (compared to “The principle 
of minimum information necessary for the performance of tasks”, 
                                               
handle personal information for specific, clear and reasonable purposes. It shall not 
expand the scope of information use, and shall not change the purposes of personal 
information handling when the relevant subject of personal information has no 
knowledge thereof.”).  
386 See id.at art. 4.2(b) (“The principle of minimum information necessary for 
the performance of tasks -- The administrator of personal information shall only 
handle the minimum amount of information relevant to the handling purposes, and 
shall delete the personal information involved within the shortest period of time 
after the handling purposes are fulfilled.”).  
387 See id. at art. 5.2.5 (“Personal information shall be directly collected from a 
subject of personal information by the means and methods already notified thereto.  
It is not allowed to adopt covert means or indirect methods to collect personal in-
formation.”).  
388 Id. at art. 4.2 
389 Id. at art. 5.1. 
390 Id. at art. 4.1.5. 
391 Annex to the Recommendation of the Council of Sept. 23, 1980, Guidelines 
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, art. 
8 (“Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used, 
and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and 
kept up-to-date.”). 
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which is the PRC national standard) and “Purpose Specification 
Principle”392 (compared to “the principle of clear purposes” in the 
PRC this national standard).  
The guidelines are quite important because those ISPs and 
Internet operators that are to follow these guidelines are the agents 
of state Internet surveillance in the PRC.393  As a result, this national 
standard represents an effort on the part of the PRC to restrict state 
Internet surveillance of personal information.  Admittedly, these 
standards represent non-binding guidelines, although their 
similarity to the standards contained in the OECD Council 
Recommendation and EU Directives is to be commended. 
 As the introduction to this part emphasized, the PRC 
legislation, regulations adopted by the State Council and ministerial 
measures adopted in relation to Internet surveillance provide no 
real procedural and substantive limitations on the government’s 
Internet surveillance powers.  While the notion of an unrestrained 
government when it comes to Internet surveillance is repugnant to 
liberal democracies, in a way it is more predictable than the practices 
of the United States when it comes to Internet surveillance, 
inasmuch as the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides U.S. citizens with the basis for holding a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, whereas nothing in PRC law 
would provide such a reasonable expectation to PRC citizens.  The 
management philosophy and governance method of the PRC 
government, at least when it comes to Internet surveillance, still 
involve strong top-down political pressure and bottom-up 
                                               
392 Id. at art. 9  
(“The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified 
not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited 
to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible 
with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of 
purpose.”);  
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Guidelines on the Pro-
tection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (2013), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/                                                                       
oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
393 See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1417, 1425-39 (2009) (analyzing the costs of additional ISP regulation against 
the net benefit to users' privacy interests).  See also Cheung, supra note 340, at 11 
(“the Chinese government has successfully created a culture of self-censorship not 
only among its citizens, but also by co-opting local and foreign investors.  These 
capitalists duly comply with the general wishes of the government, and also act on 
its behalf as non-state actors.”).  
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maintenance of social stability, under the broad backdrop of 
centralized authoritarianism.394 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
 There are many differences between the laws governing 
Internet surveillance of the United States and the People’s Republic 
of China.  With regard to the United States, there are many legal 
restrictions on the government in conducting Internet surveillance.  
The main one is the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  The threefold limitation in the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and the judicial warrant 
mechanism in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 are 
other important examples.  However, the exact regulations that 
govern the NSA’s activities are unknown.  What is known is that the 
NSA and other intelligence agencies get their permission from a 
secret court whose decisions are not available for review.  While the 
hope is that this court exercises caution in granting such permission, 
the 99.97 percent rate of granting requests is not particularly 
encouraging, although it is not determinative one way or the other. 
With regard to the PRC, there ostensibly are only two 
instruments that limit the government’s Internet surveillance 
efforts: the 2000 Telecommunications Regulations and the 2013 
Guidelines on Personal Information Protection of Public and 
Commercial Service Information Systems.  The former appears to be 
empty inasmuch as no procedures have been “stipulated by law,” 
as the regulations require an order for there to be an actual limit on 
the government when it comes to surveillance.  The latter is 
contained in non-binding guidelines.  The rest of the instruments are 
unequivocal in allowing the government unfettered access to 
personal information when conducting Internet surveillance.  
 With regard to similarities, the PRC government has been 
using "delegated control" over ISPs to control the Internet, and the 
U.S. government appears to have done the same to some extent, 
which some commentators refer to as “a regime of regulation, co-
                                               
394 See Shen, supra note 358, at 561 (providing examples of companies’ com-
plaints when doing business in China); See also Cheung, supra note 340, at 8 (dis-
cussing the nine government-approved internet agencies, all of which pass through 
the Ministry of Information Industry’s servers in Beijing, Shanghai, or Guangzhou).  
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regulation and self-regulation.”395  Moreover, both governments 
appear to have overwhelming access to all information when 
national security and public interests are involved.  Whether this is 
troubling or not depends on one’s views on the magnitude of the 
threats to national security that are out there and how trustworthy 
the government is seen when using such information.  Of course, the 
government has a legitimate interest in getting information to 
protect national security, especially by forcing ISPs and other 
Internet operators to provide it with electronic privacy information.  
However, surely there must be some limits within which these 
governments operate.  Inasmuch as the limits are not clear in both 
jurisdictions, that potentially is a main area for improvement in the 
future.  
In the short term, the question becomes which approach to 
Internet surveillance is potentially more harmful to the citizens who 
live under both regimes.  Is it more attractive from a citizen’s 
perspective to know that the government is watching, or is it more 
attractive for a citizen to have faith in law and the rule of law that 
the government is not watching but then it turns out that the 
government is watching?  With the former situation, citizens can 
adjust their behavior in order to avoid government scrutiny.  In the 
later, citizens are lulled into a false sense of security concerning 
personal privacy and data, which ultimately might expose them to 
considerable consequences that were not anticipated.  Which would 
you prefer?  The answer to this question likely depends on one’s 
own preferences for predictability, with a strong preference 
presumably leading to tolerance of extensive interference in Internet 
life.  Assuming U.S. citizens had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
with their Internet use before the Snowden revelations, surely the 
reasonableness of such expectations has been diminished, if not 
entirely removed.  Of course, a determination by the appellate 
courts of the unconstitutionality of such searches and seizures 
would restore such reasonableness of expecting privacy, although it 
is unclear how the courts will decide.  Assuming it no longer is 
reasonable to expect privacy from the government where the 
government even remotely suspects a threat to national security or 
public interests, tolerance for open surveillance can become a 
rational, even optimal, option.  
The main problem for both societies is how to restrict the 
government's ability to force ISPs and other Internet operators to 
                                               
395 Cheung, supra note 340, at 21. 
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share private electronic information with the government in the 
name of national security and ordre public.  The long-term solution 
to over-intrusive Internet surveillance has got to be the 
establishment of limits on states' powers to force ISPs to give them 
private electronic information.  On the international level, more 
norms are needed.  Instead of arguing for the creation of more limits 
through a new multilateral treaty, this article would prefer to update 
those provisions in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and 
the ICCPR that deal with the right to privacy, as those instruments 
were drafted decades ago, and so it was difficult, if not impossible, 
for the drafters of those instruments to foresee the importance of 
Internet privacy and the extensive abuse of state power from 
Internet surveillance.  Updates might include how to restrict a state's 
power to get information from big data companies, such as 
Facebook, Google, and Yahoo, even when seeking this information 
in the name of national security or public interests.  Updates might 
also include a Prohibitive Provisions Mode, which, like the U.S. 
Constitution, indicates what the government cannot do, not just 
what rights citizens enjoy.  Moreover, if the government is allowed 
to do something in special cases, such as in the name of national 
security and public interests, these instruments could help establish 
the worldwide procedural requirements that should be complied 
with.  In addition, it might be helpful to identify the kind of 
"Effective Remedy" (under Article 2 of ICCPR) that can and should 
be set up in the treaty.  Updates of the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights and the ICCPR might help these instruments be 
implemented in an effective manner in modern times, although 
admittedly amending these instruments will not be easy.  In the end, 
while the PRC approach to Internet surveillance might be more 
predictable than the approach of the United States, both fall far short 
of the mark established by international human rights law. 
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